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THE EARLY HERESIES  
IN THE  
DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN RELIGION

It is perhaps disrespectful to refer to a world religion — Buddhism — as a heresy, even if it has its unfavoured siblings, Jainism and Ājivakism. But the word « heresy » is easily justified, in that all these schools, and others less durable, agree with the orthodox Hinduism of their period in the questions that are to be asked. These schools are all cast in the same mould, share the same assumptions for the most part, and are equally authoritarian with orthodoxy. The heresies are trying to answer orthodox questions and, as with other schisms, they did not necessarily start out to be heresies: they were put out of the fold, just as were the Wesleyans, or even Lutherans. But they all have the same goal as orthodoxy — freedom from transmigration, or bliss as it may be called — and all acknowledge an instant which is irreversible — enlightenment, attainable in this life. The brahman's goal is exactly the same, but he makes less fuss about it, because every brahman should retire from the world and win knowledge, his brahmin birthright.

The basic factor that causes these various movements to be considered heresies in classical times (a period that we might stretch from the usurpation of Puṣyamitra in 184 B.C. to the death of Harṣa in 648 A.D.) is that they all rejected the absolute authority of the *Rg* and other *Vedas*, *Brāhmaṇas*, and *Upaniṣads*. In their initial period of the late 6th century B.C., this rejection would include the *Rg*, *Sāma*, and *Yajur Vedas*. The status of the *AtharvaVeda* to brahmans of other schools through the 6th century B.C. is not certain; its full acceptance as a *Veda* may be paralleled by the gradual absorption of local and pre-Aryan gods/godlings into Puranic Hinduism, the local priesthoods being given *brāhmaṇa* status, and hence the *atharvan/aṅgirases* have access to *RgVedic* material. Or we might say since such access is guaranteed by such material in the *AtharvaVeda*, once one has to know the spell/rite, the process of linguistic change would eliminate those who knew only the phonetics without

knowing the meaning of each word and so the *AtharvaVeda*, would become fully recognized by becoming more exclusive.

Along with the first three *Vedas* their *brāhmaṇas* would also be rejected, but how much of the *Āraṇyakas* and *Upaniṣads* it would be heretical to reject would depend on how canonical such matter had become and also on how much of them was known, which in view of the secret nature of such teaching and doctrine might be almost none officially. But on the assumption of secrecy it is very hard to explain the completely brahmanical mould of *kṣatriya* heresies. Of the *Upaniṣads* that are later canonical, only the *Aitareya*, *Taittirīya*, the original *Maitrāyaṇī*, *BrhadĀraṇyaka* (except for a few final touches), most of *Chāndogya*, possibly *Kena*, and the matter of *Kauṣītaki* are in existence in 500 B.C.; Īśa just (ca 515) but the *BhagavadGita* is certainly not, and of our *Dharma-Sūtras* there would be only *Gautama* and *Baudhāyana*. To these one would add at least the matter of the *SrautaSūtras*; *Lāṭyāyana/Drāhyāyana Srauta Sūtras*, and the *NidhānaSūtra* seem to date about 590. It is quite clear that the progressive part of BAU 3-4 was not canonical till Buddha's own time. Such contradictory views can be found in the literature of the 6th century that one might wonder why there were no heretics before. We suggest that the decisive step made heretics was organization. The movements that become heresies, or produced them, were only part of the anti-ritual reaction in which many brahmins were engaged. Ritual reached its culmination around 600 B.C., and Professor Wagle [JOIB 1969] is preparing to show that the round of the *Srauta-Sūtras* was very much alive in Buddha's time.

As long as the system is not overtly attacked, not many people are likely to worry, and many are likely not to realize that it is being attacked. For instance, the implications of modernist « art » are not understood by its wealthy patrons. Again, we find in the Catholic church a great deal of freedom both today and in the centuries preceding the reformation (which is usually overlooked in the interests of an unfavourable image). So in India Kautsa is reported to have denied any value in studying the *Veda*, since the hymns are nonsensical. Kautsa is refuted by Yāska, so that one would expect Kautsa to be later than the 7th century B.C. — perhaps the 9th. Kautsa could still be a good brahmin, as he might still believe in *tapas*, in sacrifice, in caste, collectively or severally. Again, we find people who should be brahmins by their names among the Ājīvakas, some of whom are precursors of that sect, e.g. Prakudha Kātyāyana (fl. 540?), Pūraṇa Kāśyapa (ob. 504), Nanda Vaccha (Skt. Vātsya), Kisa Sankicca (Skt. Kṛśa Sāṅkṛtya) should all be brahmins.

### *Common ground of orthodoxy and heresies*

There is a tendency to study Buddhism, Hindu orthodoxy, and its six systems, Jainism, and deisms all separately, as if they had no influence

on one another. But they were in fact contemporary, and usually in close propinquity, if not contact, and we should expect mutual influence. For instance, organization demanded system, so in the reply to the challenge of system orthodoxy too had to find out what it believed; hence we get the countersystem(s) known as *Sāṃkhya*. The attack on orthodoxy is not ethical or emotional but intellectual and philosophic; no new god or conception of god is offered. Correspondingly it is the philosophic side of Hinduism that is developed by the thinking class in the early Formative period. We may have to describe one system at a time, but we should keep a synchronic attitude, for we will find parallel movements in heresy and orthodoxy, e.g. the deistic trend (an orthodox initiative), the saviour cult, and so on. Just as the same ideas influence members of all Christian sects today, and we find far more real disagreement within these sects than between them, so should we also remember that it is likely to have been like this in India, since people of all temperaments are born into all religions. An age of competition is an age of communication, and in such, esoteric doctrines or secrets cannot be favoured by the general people.

Since the brahmin needs the perfect, and therefore the static, all systems tend to be presented to us as complete from the beginning, born like Athene from the head of Zeus. But we cannot in fact be sure that the whole system is contemporary. Often indeed it is not, but as everything has to be attributed to the founder or his pupils in order to have authority, it is not easy to find out what is later. One might ask, « Is it credible that Buddha never came to new opinions after his enlightenment? ». One would expect that the enlightenment pointed the way to solving certain questions; but the Buddhist position would be that, since Buddha became perfect then further progress was impossible. Historically this is saying that no new questions were raised in Buddha's lifetime (and in the 44 years of his teaching ministry this is unlikely) or alternatively that no questions arose after, which the story of the second Council itself denies.

The heresies all share this in common, that we do not now have the *ipsissima verba* of their founders. Nor indeed did their various churches even at an early period. The unsuccessful are only known from the deliberately distorting reports of their adversaries, which, considering the professed freedom from emotion and *nirvāṇa*-seeking of their authors, are remarkably full of unscrupulous animus. Owing to the instruction to speak to the people in their own language, the scriptures of the heresies have not been free of linguistic change, and the stage of linguistic development in the 6th century B.C. is much disputed. My own opinion is that the reformers of that century would be speaking practically classical Sanskrit, which is the ordinary cultured language down to the time of Mahāpadma Nanda, though latterly it has stayed behind popular speech. It is superseded by the early Prākṛit as the language of upper classes on the submergence, decisive under Mahāpadma, of the old *kṣatriyas* and

their *purohitas*, and the parallel emergence of middle and mercantile classes who form the basis of his support. This stage is represented by the *Prākritis* of Aśoka. We suggest this because we do not see that he can have been addressing his ordinary subjects in a dialect with no prestige, but full of archaisms. The Buddhist *Pāli* is then stereotyped in the language of the 2nd century B.C., while much of the Jain canon might be linguistically 2nd and 3rd centuries A.D.<sup>1</sup>

But it is also very clear that the sacred books have received innumerable additions and explanations in the very core of the expositions. It is still difficult to know just what was taught and when we do, it is not easier to know what was meant when it was first taught. It was meant against a background which it was itself instrumental in changing; and only quite a small part of the background has survived, at least recognizably as such.

While our surviving *Brāhmaṇas* come mainly from further up the Ganges basin, they need not represent all Indian thought. For instance the Āgastyas, who went south early, where therefore archaisms of a marginal area might be expected to survive, are not represented at all,

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1. The chronology of language development is much disputed. My view is that (virtually) Classical Sanskrit is the spoken language from c 650 - 400/350 BC. Pāṇini gives the rules for goods speech c 420, and Kātyāyana brings them up to date c 240, perhaps more for brahmans. The reason for such a necessity could be the rising social prestige of new classes at court, rising with the urban revolution and decline and fall of the old kṣatriya families and their attendant brahmin *purohitas*. For this reason the court language of the Mauryas was Prakrit, and I think Aśoka's edicts (fairly) represent popular speech, since the emperors are not likely to accept a dead dialect without prestige for their official language. Than means *Pāli* had not yet developed by 250 BC. The *Pāli* stage is reached in Kharavela's inscription of c 165 BC, and I would suggest that the Jain Prakrit is largely of the 1st/2nd centuries AD.

This view of Buddha's language may be supported by Vinaya 2.138, in which Norman has shown the proper translation of a key word. Certain bhikkhus damage Buddha's words by their own dialect — *sakāya niruttiyā dusenti*. He is asked « May we translate the Buddha's words at will, *chandaso*? » Buddha reproves the questioners — *vigarahi Buddho Bhagavān*. Buddha's words are not to be translated at will, *na chandaso āropetabbam*, and who would do so has committed a misdeed. « I permit acquiring my words in my own language. » *anujānāmi bhikkave sakāya niruttiyā Buddhavacanānam pariāpunitum*. Norman points out that *sva* (*sakāya*) must refer to the subject of the sentence in both cases, and also that permission to versify (*chandas* = verse, or Vedic) does not make much sense or very good grammar. The Sanskrit original was *chandaśas*, not *-sas*. He points out that Buddha is being asked whether we can translate for those who do not speak his original language. The linguistic context of this of this is not very good for Buddha's own time, since he certainly did not speak Vedic, and the populace in 500 BC is unlikely to have spoken a more developed Prakrit than Aśoka's of 250. But it does make sense in a 3rd or 2nd century context, revealing conservative pressures within the church. As Norman says, the questioners are *brahmīns*, to whom *Sanskrit* is sacred, and even more Vedic. We have the conservative side — The word is infeasible — and the liberal non-caste answer — It is open to all Buddhists. The conservatives were not always successful, but we do have Buddhist Sanskrit; but to the orthodox Sanskrit and Vedic were not for everybody. The passage makes easy sense as reflecting one of the problems of developing Buddhism, and if Buddha was himself speaking (something very close to) Classical Sanskrit.

to judge by the names and *pravaras*. What was happening in the flourishing kingdom of Avanti, or in the Punjab we do not know; the heresies we do know are all centered in Magadha, modern Bihar. But they are not without much longer preparation in that area than is generally thought, for Videha (on the opposite north side of the Ganges) was an important brahmanic centre as early as Rajana Kauneya (fl. 900 B.C., schematic), while the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* is eastern, and its *BrhadĀraṇyaka Upaniṣad* very close indeed to Buddhism.

The economic and political environment in India was in rapid change and growth, especially during the formative period of the heresies, which may be said to end about 100 B.C., though possibly earlier. There is therefore a social aspect to the general movement, but this is not to say that there was a revolt of youth on the modern Romantic pattern. In the destruction of Western Christian society it is important that revolt or rebellion should be a good word; this is not so in any society before Rousseau. Any revolt in ancient India is to extend traditional values, not to destroy them. Thus all the heresies agree in denying caste; but it cannot be said they denied it except in the spiritual sphere. There they are unanimous in the denunciation — not that they argue for caste anywhere — but there is quite certainly no interest in political or economic egalitarianism. It is quite possible that caste did not have notable economic implications in the 6th century B.C., or indeed during the whole economic explosion of urban culture down to about 250 B.C. It is also likely that it had no implications of political power in the 6th century: salvation was not political, and *kṣatriyas* like Gautama or (Mahāvīra) Vardhamāna, or even a prosperous *vaiśya* (?) like Gośāla, need not have a desire for political innovation. Caste restrictions on marriage are not likely to have worried anyone, since the normal marriage was arranged. The only thing that might be resented, and apparently was, was the spiritual implication of the brahmin claim to superiority of being. This could only be upheld if he maintained his pretended monopoly of *brahma*; *brahma* in the 7th-6th centuries is the source of power, magic, and miracles, and in the popular mind is often later equated with the supernatural powers of *tapas*, asceticism, so that we find the Buddhists continually reproving those who become monks just to acquire those powers, which there is no other way of doing. Thus the heresies can be considered as the attempt of the unqualified to enter the thinking class, though they might not see it that way. Their own phraseology would rather be that they wanted to acquire *brahma*(n). But we might note, that even when they succeed in entering the thinking class, they tend to be withdrawn from the genetic pool in celibacy, whereas the brahmins have had a duty of progeny.

The Buddhists are always attacking caste<sup>1a</sup>. It is still there in the *LalitaVistara* 159 (2nd century A.D.?). But would be hard to find any

1a. E.g., *Majjhima* 3.83, *Digha* 2.81, *Majjhima* 2.147, and so on, cf. THOMAS, pp. 84-5.

attack on caste as an injustice to the *śūdra*, much less the untouchable. It is much more like the attacks on class distinction of English socialism; the English need class to be happy socially, and contentedly discontented. We may hear that there is no real qualification for brahminhood in the *Nikāyas*; for example, brahmin brothers would receive different honours according to their moral character, not only according to their learning; any man who adopted an ascetic life would be honoured as a recluse; pure brahmin descent for seven generations cannot be proved; birth, caste, or wealth do not make a man better or worse; castes are distinguished by their sources of wealth, but are designations, just as a fire of logs is a wood fire; brahmins no longer keep to their caste duties or obey caste laws<sup>2</sup>. The attack is essentially negative.

The failure of the Jain attack on caste is even more complete than that of the Buddhists. As on earth there are scavengers who live apart from other men, i.e., there are untouchables, so in heaven there are gods who do menial service for other gods, and live apart from them. There is a special kind of *karma*, *gotra karma*, which determines the caste into which one will be born in the next life. In fact, the Jains survived in India by becoming a caste, so that these quotations are in some degree unfair, as they cannot be attributed to Mahāvīra; but it is clear that while Jainism does ignore caste spiritually, it is no anti-caste crusade. Indeed one might suggest that it is because the backbone of support comes from the more prosperous classes, merchants and *kṣatriyas*; and not from the *śūdras*, that caste remains. It is notable that the *śūdras* and untouchables no more swarm into the heresies than they did into Islam or Christianity.

The Ājīvaka position on caste we cannot know from their scriptures, since none have survived. But a *rathakāra*, cartwright (a low caste by the 6th century B.C.), a *brahman*, *kṣatriyas*, and *Gośāla* (apparently a *vaiśya*) are all amicably in the order. So here too we can assume revolt against caste in the religious sphere; but the Ājīvakas too become virtually a caste later, and there is no sign that their revolt either extended beyond the spiritual sphere. In no case is there any reason why it should; since if the world is worthless, the great possibility of life is to obtain *brahma/mokṣa/nirvāṇa*, not to achieve wealth, power, or social integration. In so far as caste belongs to the unreality of phenomenal life, it is not worth further argument. Nor would there have been any point in attacking the authority of the *Vedas* had not the brahmin caste claimed (and held) a monopoly of them; for much could be found in the *Upaniṣads* that would in itself have been perfectly acceptable.

If the heresies differ from orthodoxy in denying caste and the *Veda*, basic agreement will be found in all other matters. The aim of life, or rather the only sensible thing to do about it to get the best, is to get the permanent, the true; and this can only be done by transcending the phy-

2. DN 1.104, *SuttaNipata* 284-315.



sical and the desire for it. There is no need to deny the world of the fathers, and I doubt if any passage could be found proving that such a place did not exist. The attraction of that world was that desires were satisfied there, and this is still true of the various heavens admitted in the classical patterns of *samsāra*; but residence therein was not a state that could be guaranteed to eternity, and one had plenty of desires to fulfil. One was in fact still at the mercy of desire in heaven: so BAU 4/4.22, « Desire for sons is desire for wealth, desire for wealth is desire for worlds/the world; both of these are just desires ». Transcendence of such desires might make one independent of one's earthly descendents. But if one has no desires, one needs nobody (else). And here we can understand the appeal of the negative and static eternity in India: all his life the Indian has been a mere social cog, to caste or family, and here we have the protest of individualism — but in the spiritual sphere only. Hear again BAU 4/4.22: « Knowing this indeed the ancients did not want offspring, thinking 'What will we do with offspring, we of whom is the self here, this world here' »?<sup>3</sup>

There is no divine command to improve one's self, since in so far as one is *ātman* (and the *ātman* is in itself without desire), one is not capable of any essential improvement. Hence there is no place for a saviour. Seeking a saviour forms an emotional tie since there is another who is benefactor also. And one cannot be saved intellectually by another; one can only be instructed. But the act of understanding is one's own initiative. And since mind and character are only additions to the *ātman*, (not, as to a Christian, its essence), the *ātman*, being basically only existence, cannot improve. At the most it can exist freed. But if it is freed from desire, transmigration can never be more than a chore and can never do anything for a soul that neither knows nor cares. Desire is the inevitable consequence of birth, and the Buddhist may argue that, if the effect (desire) is annihilated, the cause (birth) cannot continue. So he reacts to the proposition that transmigration must be escaped, which everyone agrees with; and so with everyone approves *mokṣa*, release.

But if men want release, no one wants release from something pleasant. Hence life becomes thought of as pain, *duḥkha* (*nemine contradicente*), though the Buddhists are most explicit on this. One would think that, *ceteris paribus*, the most likely times for pessimism on human life are those ages which witness destructive change of an accepted society. Such a society has provided the stability whereby men could adjust to their environment, and its passing leaves a vacuum. This pattern would apply to the growing economic and political amorality that culminated in the Nanda empire of the 4th century B.C. Even if the things of this world are originally good, and are still worth sacrificing for as late as 500 B.C., yet by being confronted with something « better », the better is

3. ...etād dha sma vai tāt pūrve (brāhmaṇā anācāṇā) vidvāṁsaḥ prajāṁ nā kāmāyante kim prajāyā kariṣyāmo yeṣāṁ no'yām ātmayām lokā iti.

reduced by ordinary human « logic » or feeling to being good, and the merely good to (positively) bad. The first stage may be represented by Sāyakāyana in BAU 4/4.4 and .6-7, or 4/3.13 & .21: « The soul in dream going up and down makes himself (like) a god, many forms, both delighting himself with women as it were, eating, and even as it were seeing horrors<sup>4</sup>, but he may also return into deep sleep, which is even profounder joy, in which he knows nothing within or without ». In the first pair the man with desire may make himself a very nice form, but the man without desire becomes immortal and reaches brahma. Prakudha Kātyāyana may also be at this stage, for while his soul certainly has to free itself from matter, since pain is one of the elemental atoms of the universe, one would not think he conceived life as being pain. The positive assertion of life as pain may well be Buddha's, and it seems to be accepted by the advanced thinkers in Magadha within two decades of his enlightenment for there is nothing in Jainism to suggest that life is an enjoyable and thrilling adventure: the *kevalin* will not come back. This attitude would also seem to infect the latest verses in BAU, e.g. 4/4.10-11<sup>5</sup>:

4. *jakṣat* should rather come from *ghas*, eat, 3rd class, which shows opt. *jakṣiyāt* rather than *has* = laugh, which does not show such form. Eating may seem rather an ungenteel pleasure for such a lofty passage, but one should remember the importance of feasting on delicious viands and cates to those very genteel figures, the Arthurian knights.

5. The *Mādhyandina* text is the more original.

BAU 4/4.10

*andhān tāmāḥ praviśanti | yé'sambhūtim upāsate*  
*tāto bhūya iva té tāmo | yā u sambhūtiām ratāḥ*

(Double *sandhi*, or *va* for *iva* in c.).

Isa rather than BAU may be the source of these verses. Radhakrishnan explains and does not translate; Hume translates without explanation. Of two bad things one is worse, *sambhūti*. We can take it as 'becoming together', and refer it to *ātman*. Either we have the materialist like Ajita, whose soul as an atomic compound is dissolved without remainder on death; this might explain why some are *ratāḥ* in the compound; there is a pun, they delight and cease in it (in annihilation). Or Buddha's collection if *skandhas* could be equally criticized as a *sambhūti*. The non-uniting, *asambhūti*, could be referred to Prakudha Kātyāyana, who would still have more prestige than Buddha in 520. He is accused of believing that atoms had no *sambhūti*, real contact with one another. He was certainly misunderstood by some, and may have been meaning that the union of *karma* and *jīva* atoms was not indissoluble — he was orthodox enough to leave traces of his doctrine in *KathU*, but our author Pārāsarya (?) may have found it difficult to believe both in the efficacy of ritual and his atomic theory. But as Prakudha's doctrine was developed (in the heresies) or absorbed (in early *Sāmkhya*), his importance declined, and the verse was used against more dangerous thinkers, substituting as in the K version *vidyā/avidyā* for *sambhūti/asambhūti*. Those who make a big thing of *avidyā* should be the followers of Sañjaya Vairāṣṭriputra, who declared knowledge impossible. They are now not so bad as those who delight in knowledge, i.e. whose leaders are omniscient, enlightened. This should mean Buddha, Jina, Gosala etc., and we have suggested (note 52, Ch. IV) the possibility of mispronouncing it is not accidental.

*avidyāṃso 'budho janaḥ | avidvān sa buddho janaḥ*

*anandā (M. asuryā) nāma te lokāḥ*

M's *asura* worlds are connected with destruction; the substituted *ananda* denies heretics the bliss of their *nirvāna*. It could say that the world is joyless, and heretics come back to it. (Life is pain.).



« Into blind darkness they enter who worship/meditate non-productivity/not-uniting-into-being/ignorance, into almost greater those that delight in the production/knowledge. Joyless indeed are these worlds, covered with blind darkness. Into them they go after death, ignorant, unintelligent fellows ».

### *The self, its terminologies and teachers*

If we are to know or reach the *ātman*, sooner or later we will want to know what it is. The heresies, like orthodoxy, all have some theory on this point, and all agree that we cannot find the *ātman* (or super-*ātman*, or non-*ātman*, *nirvāṇa*) as we are in the everyday world, or without preparation. For any desire or sense-impression, being part of the sense *manas*, mind, is not the self, *ātman*; any sense in relation to the soul is not as part to whole, but as (obstructing/opaque) accident to substance. The only way to get over the obstacle of sense is to stop sensing, which is achieved by trance, meditation, *samādhi*, *dhyāna*, the mature stage of *tapas*, austerity. The materialists may deny that the *ātman* exists after death, but, like our own materialists, they are quite sure of the powers of its conglomeration so long as that lasts. Hence to attain those powers they are quite as much committed to *tapas* as anyone else. This may seem irrational to us, since the conclusion of the present-day materialist is that he should be an epicure. But we should remember the sexual connections of *tapas*, and also that the refinements of wine and gluttony were probably not widely available in 6th century India. Power and simple self-indulgence, not to mention indolence, would provide the materialist with sufficient reason for austerities where the standard of living is low anyway. The stock charge against a rival sect is that of sexual indulgence.

It is usually found that in a revolution, though the thinkers agree on the (main) errors of the old establishment, they do not agree on the answers and so split into more and more divisions as the answers given themselves raise further questions. This is true also of the early Formative period of India. Our information on many of these answers, the unsuccessful heresies, is highly partisan, with much more *odium theologicum* than would seem consistent with the freedom from passion so necessary to *nirvāṇa*. On the orthodox side, orthodoxy has a remarkable faculty for ignoring heretics and other improper facts altogether. Orthodox writings will denounce heretics, but will not name them, and it is in vain that we look in the Epic for a doctrine that can be tied down to a given heretical sect, or as reply to such. So our evidence is mainly from the heresies, which are no more helpful in informing us of orthodox doctrines.

It is generally considered that Mahāvīra refounded an order founded by Pārśva, 250 years before him, who himself had a predecessor Ariṣṭanemi. The predecessor, Nami, of this last is not usually taken as histo-

rical, but I suspect that we have in fact here the Janaka kings of Videha, famous for their interest in brahma: Nami (Śāpya) is the ancestor of the line, Ariṣṭanemi has a schematic date of 858-36, and his grandson (presumably) Supārśva Aṅgajit, who would be contemporary with the famous Yājñavalkya of the *Brāhmaṇas*, ruled (schematically) 814-792. Aṅgajit was recognized as a brahmin (*ŚpB* XI 6/2.10): this schematic date is 250 years before Mahāvīra's birth in 544-3. The four vows attributed to Pārśva are not to take life, not to lie, not to steal, not to own property, there is nothing anti-brahmanical in these. Unfortunately, by the time of our Jain records, Ariṣṭanemi and Pārśva have been transferred to the domain of folklore, and are represented as classical Jains.

We know the names of two teachers of Buddha, Ālāra Kālāma (Skt. Ārāla) and Udraka Rāmaputra, but the contribution credited to them by tradition seems to be rather yogic than intellectual. From Ālāra came the Third Attainment, the perception that «There is nothing», and Udraka had got to the Fourth in the same — neither consciousness nor non-consciousness — which might well correspond to the orthodox state compared to *śuṣupti*, dreamless sleep. One suspects these teachers were not *brahmans*, since *brahmin-putra* names are usually metronymics, and there is no sign of the names in the surviving *pravaras*. But such evidence is very weak.

More is known about Prakudha/Kakudha Kātyāyana, who is quite likely the Kaṇḍhin Kātyāyana of *Praśna Upaniṣad* and whose date would be *ca.* 540, and also about Pūraṇa Kāśyapa, *ob.* 504. Both were fore-runners of the *Ājīvakas* of Makkhalī/Maskarin Gośāla, who died in 488<sup>6</sup>. We may first consider the doctrine of Prakudha Kātyāyana, as far as our garbled, or rather-garbling, source permits us to make sense out of it.

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6. The chronology is based on our *Dates & Dynasties of Ancient India*. The key date is Buddha's *nirvana* in 486 B.C. On the *Ājīvakas* we derive great help from Basham's book on the subject, but adjust his absolute dates. We may be able to make slight improvements to support his general reconstruction. Basham says Pūraṇa died in the 11th year of Mahāvīra's asceticism; Mahāvīra was born in 544-3; renouncing the world at (Indian) age 30, this would be in 514 B.C. Pūraṇa would then die in 504-3, say rather earlier in the year; in 504, Mahāvīra attained enlightenment after 12 years, so this is in 502 (-01); but Makkhalī claimed his enlightenment two years earlier, in 504-3. The obvious suggestion is that he did so on the death of Pūraṇa, just as Gotama Indrabhūti only attained his on Mahāvīra's. This accounts for the importance of Pūraṇa to the *Ājīvakas* that their greatest was his successor. He is said by the Jains only to have been an ascetic for 12 years, but as the Buddhists report him as having met Buddha before Buddha's enlightenment, i.e. between 536 and 530, it is therefore much more likely that Pūraṇa reached his enlightenment/headship of the followers of Prakudha Kātyāyana in the 13th year before own death, i.e. in 516-5; the next inference would be the death of Prakudha in that year, 516-5. The Jains say Gośāla died in the 24th year of his asceticism, that is that he turned ascetic in 511, which was the 3rd year of Mahāvīra's asceticism. But the Jain account is very tendentious, and it is more likely that Gośāla was not a pupil of Mahāvīra's, though possibly a fellow-pupil. If any date is to be suggested for his renunciation, we would suggest him as the first pupil of Pūraṇa's after Pūraṇa's enlightenment.

« There are seven elements: earth, air, fire, water, pain [*duḥkha*], pleasure [*sukha*], and life [*jīva*]. These elements do not interact, do not move, do not transmute; they do not cause one another to be molested » such is the vulgate translation<sup>7</sup>. This may look stupid, as it is meant to, but there must be reasoning behind it. Not much later Parmenides in Greece could deny motion, on the ground that it implies the existence of non-existence. If the substances are not interacting, then the soul cannot be a compound. And Prakudha, unlike Ajita Keśakambalin, is not accused of asserting annihilation on death; he is reproved for the doctrine of permanence, *śaśvattā*. His permanent soul is material, and whether he used the word *ātman* does not well appear from the evidence of DN 1.56. Whether there is one *jīva* in a creature, or the *ātman* is made up of many atoms of *jīva* or every atom is (a) *jīva*, is not clear. The second seems less likely since there is survival after physical death, and death should spilt an aggregation. But of course if there is no motion, this argument does not apply. The third possibility is rather ruled out by the fact that *jīva* is one of several atom species. It would then seem that each atom of *jīva* must inhabit a different body. This will account for the Ājīvaka infinity of *jīvas*. But it will also help to account for the Jain 1-sense, *ekendriya jīva*. If the *jīva* has not in itself any senses, then there is no reason why there should not be one-sense, two-sense *jīvas* in the phenomenal world. The Jain is recognizing the role of life in life, e.g. all living creatures we know live mainly on life. Salt and water are the only dead matter immediately eaten, but water is necessary to all life and salt is either not eaten by animals or is necessary to humans. Hence it is easy to infer that these elements have only a less active life than grass. There also the connection of heat and air as necessary to life, hence it is easy to suppose they too must contain it to pass it on. And further, in the early (Indo-European) animism, everything may have life. The Jain position is therefore perfectly rational. But the Jains should have made an advance on the doctrine of Prakudha; how is this done? The answer we would suggest is that the Jains believe in a unity of matter, *pudgala*, while Prakudha did not; his atoms are coeternal. But if this is, so, how are we going to say that the atoms are in no relation or connection? Must we re-translate?

If atoms are real, they obviously cannot affect one another without (some kind of) motion. One may then say motion is unreal, just as one would have the same unreality of motion and effect if atoms are unreal.

#### 7. DN 1.56

*satt'ime mahārāja kāyā akaṭṭhā akaṭṭhāvidhā animmitā animmātā vañjhā kūṭṭhā esikaṭṭhāyitthitā | te na iñjanti na vipariñamanti na vyābādhenti aññam aññam nālam aññamaññassa sukhāya vā dukkhāya vā sukhadukkhāya vā*

« Seven are these bodies, King, unmade, having an uncreated form, not fashioned or formed, sterile, erect, stable as a pillar. They do not move, they do not transmute, they do not cause one another to be molested; they are not competent for the pleasure, pain or both of one another ».

The Buddhist parody would seem to make Prakudha deny the reality of effect, i.e., appearance, motion. When they tell us that Prakudha said that one who spilt a head with a sword does not kill anyone, but merely makes a hole between seven indestructible bodies, any Christian could agree with the sentiment. For all that he can believe happens in war or murder is that a soul is despatched to its final reward sooner than might have been anticipated; he denies the end-of-life, not-of-incarnation. A less-tendentious presentation of Prakudha's belief may be found in *KaṭhU*. (1) 2.18-20<sup>8</sup> (much admired by Emerson, and copied in « If the red slayer think he slays ... »), which we translate as: « He who knows the ecstasy is neither born nor dies; he is not anywhere, he has not become anyone; unborn, inner, eternal, primeval, he is not killed when a/the body is killed. If killer, one thinks to kill/he kills, if killed, one thinks 'A killing is made', both these do not discern; this neither kills nor is killed ». There is no slayer or slain, and the Buddhists add, no hearer or speaker, knower or explainer, which, might apply as justly to Buddhist serialism.

This would be understandable on a serialist theory of the selfconsciousness, that events are entities static, consecutive, and essentially unrelated, which would differ from the classical Buddhist theory only in that the sequence is causally connected to the Buddhist. Could Prakudha's atoms allow such a theory? The atoms are not created, having forms (i.e. as well as essence), not created, not diminished (?) not measured out<sup>9</sup>, barren (i.e. they do not produce a third party by mixing, whether by themselves or with one another), isolated/unchangeable<sup>10</sup>, standing a pillar-reed-standing. The sense impressions are atomic in the early 6th century. For example, in *BAU* 4/2.3 the meeting-place of the

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8. (18) *na jāyate na mriyate vā vipaścid | nāyaṁ kutaścin na babhūva kaścit  
ajo nityaḥ śaśvato'yaṁ purāṇo | na hanyate hanyamāne śarīre*

For *vipaścid* « knowing the ecstasy », cf. *vip-ra*, *brahman/shaman*, *vip*, shake. It is interesting to see *śaśvat* in view of the Buddhist attack on Prakudha's *śaśvattā*, eternality of the world. Would a pun be possible with the root *pr*, fill?

(19) *hantā cen manyate hantum. | hataś cen manyate hatam  
ubhau tau na vijānīto | nāyaṁ hanti na hanyate*

The Vedic should be *hataś cen manyate hataś* for « The killed thinks himself killed », but the verse may have been slightly altered in its final insertion, and be later than .18 and .20, since these verses are *triṣṭubhs*, and this is *anuṣṭubh*. I would not be surprised if the original was *vijānīte*, 3rd sing. middle: « he does not discern these two for himself ». This would enable us to have no change of subject throughout the verse. (Magadhan dual might well show ending in -e). It is interesting to see *hantum*, a trace of the construction that gave Latin its oratio obliqua, but which never took hold in Sanskrit.

9. We are trying to find some difference between the terms. The vulgate would be « not created, not created, not created, not created », and it may be right. It is perhaps worth noting that there are seven adjectives, and seven elements.

10. *kūṭastha* does not seem to be philosophic before *BhG* 6.8; next comes *Pañigala Upaniṣad*. It would be possible that the epithets of the atoms only come from the 2nd century BC in their present form, though they could be trying to keep the old sense.

senses is in the *ākāśa*, in the heart; so too in 2/1.17 the *puruṣa* in withdrawing the senses rests in the *ākāśa* in the heart. But the *ātman* is only wanted to act as a substratum for the senses (BAU 4/1), which depend on *ākāśa* (i.e., they are in fact made of *ākāśa*, for they travel by the known path of the *hita* veins). But there is no finer matter than *ākāśa*, so the *ātman* must be *ākāśa*, and is situated in the heart. This is attested by Sāyakāyana's letting the *ātman* go to *ākāśa* at death in 3/2.13. But if the *ātman* is *ākāśa*, why should it not be the sense-impressions, or their ultimate understander, the *viññāna*? So we find the *viññāna* a transmigrating entity in early Buddhism. The *ātman/manas* is now its perception — hence the importance of the final *manas*, will — and we have a serialist theory of the self. Prakudha would be denying the later brahmanic *ātman*, in effect, but his *jīva*, being without intelligence, would be virtually the quality-less *ātman*. Pleasure and pain are felt like senses, but cannot be connected with the ordinary elements like light or air for sight and hearing; as felt, coming to *manas/viññāna*, they might be felt to need a separate atomic status, since Prakudha has apparently dropped the (inferential) *ākāśa*, the suprasensible element. We may now reconsider the Pali phrasing, and try *iñjanti* as transitive, with *aññam* going with each verb. « The atoms do not stir one another <sup>11</sup>, i.e. they cannot upset one another's internal structure; *na vipariṇamanti*, they do not change into one another; *na vyābādhenti*, they do not cause one another to be pushed apart/ground away <sup>12</sup>. They do not affect one another for pleasure or pain or both ». What is this statement protesting? Is it directed against animism, everything being (inhabited by) spirits? If atoms are never in real contact or relationship, how is it that there is any illusion of life and a world?

We may try answer on the following lines. It takes water, fire (and one might add air, for the draught) to make pottery, but the finished product has no water, and is quite cold and solid; therefore the contact cannot have been a very real contact. Similarly pleasure or pain come and cease independently, the *jīva* continues unchanged; sense-impressions, volitions, *manas*, are all impermanent, and therefore cannot be in real conjunction with the quality-less *jīva*. In fact the *jīva* itself cannot be a hearer or speaker, and therefore must be under *niyati*, Fate, chance, in the consciousnesses that pass over it. *Jīva* will be as impotent as any other atom, and its associations with other atoms will be chance associations. These associations may themselves be under causation, but the ini-

11. *iñj* is the normal Pali form of RV *rñj*, but the root *iñj*, stir, or a reduced 7th class form of the root *ej* (cf. *janam-jeaya*) stir, cf. Gk. *ep-eigo* should be possible.

12. *vadh* as Epic causative *vadhaya*, but cf. Gk. *(w)ōtheō* = push. Here the meaning should be that compounds are possible, but as it were without attachment, like sand. The *vi-* might refer to the individual atom, i.e. it is indivisible, or it cannot be pressed on apart, i.e. ground down and destroyed.

tial cause is by chance. And just as, if the world is unreal in its appearances, its aggregates — these appearances, events — cannot be caused by reality and events are therefore reduced to an inevitable absurd sequence, so the inevitable and the absurdity remains, even if the latter is only initial. And this is where the determinism comes in that is credited to the *Ājīvakas* of Gosāla, but in *MajjhN* 1.513 is attached to Prakudha's doctrine. Rephrasing we may say the Prakudha believes in determinism as the cause, but Buddha while he only has to remove the *jīva* for his doctrine, says human action can cause. Each has his own inconsistency; for while Buddha has no proper entity to have the free will, it is not unlikely that like other determinists, Marxist, scientific, psychological or religious, Prakudha believed in his own undeterminedness. This explains the asceticism that is indicated of him; he is not accused of sexual licence, nor that he practised asceticism for the acquisition of easy living or magical powers. The probability is that for him as for the allied Jains and *Ājīvakas*, it was the only means of extricating *jīva* from the determinism of life. It is in fact the only way of having no desire, being beyond desire, and so reaching/being the very brahma as in BAU 4/4.6. Prakudha is close to Sāyākāyana.

The *Jains* and *Ājīvakas* probably inherited the extremity of their asceticism from Prakudha. But this might also explain why Buddha tried it. It is not likely that when he renounced the world he decided to find brahma himself without a teacher. This is not the Indian way, and we are in fact told he exhausted two teachers, Aḷāra and Udraka Rama-putra. The suppression of the name of his teacher is part of the perfection of the Buddha, who could not do his basic learning from anyone, just as we are not told the effect of the teaching of John the Baptist on Jesus. But Buddha's extremes of asceticism are not likely to have been his own original experimentation; much more likely that his teachers pointed him that way. But the brahmin who had attained No-desire would not worry if his name were not handed down by his pupils, even if like so many of us, they had been set off on the wrong lines. Buddha then, we suggest, began on a doctrine very near, if not actually, that of Prakudha (*fl.* 540, *ob.* 516?), and dropped the extreme with the small but decisive adjustments of such a doctrine — not unqualified but qualified determinism and the excision of *jīva*/ātman as unknowable and therefore superfluous entities. This means that the soul/*jīva* consciousness can only be an aggregate, a compound; but its/man's power to initiate is decisive in the Enlightenment in 530. The position of name in Prakudha's scheme we do not know. His doctrine might look like a development of Buddha's, but development should not be to the caricature.



There is perhaps one further trace of Prakudha to be found in *Kaṭha*, (1/) 2.20<sup>13</sup> which has been generally understood and translated in accordance with later views. But if we remember the Jain doctrine, or at least idea, of the *jīva* being as big as the body it animates, and the *Ājīvaka* theories on the shape of the soul, we can translate our verse: « of the small smaller, of the big bigger the self of this born creature is placed in the cavity/in secret. It he who has no volition, free of pain, sees by the pellucidity of his elements, the size of the self ».

If *jīva* is an element, one would infer that Prakudha believed in a plurality of *jīvas* rather than one. This question divides orthodox and heretic alike. Atheistic *Sāṃkhya*, like *Jains* and *Ājīvakas*, accept plurality<sup>13a</sup>; the general orthodox trend of the *Upaniṣads* is to accept one final *ātman*, and Buddhism also accepts one, if *nirvāṇa* is its equivalent term, as it seems to be in at least some branches of the *Mahāyāna*.

In fact, if life, *jīva*, is an atom, then the plurality is ultimate. If we pass to the immaterial, the numerical difference is meaningless, since the abstract is not under numerical categories, and we can have the singular ultimate, which we may be (come, equally qualityless).

The view of *jīva* life, as an atom has a decisive importance in three ways: Firstly, everyone has a soul; there is now a scientific basis for this belief, and it applies to women and other animals. Whatever the prestige of tradition, the old selective world of Yama has no rational foundation henceforth. With the reduction of paradise, we may also note that fighting disappears from Indra's, which henceforth offers peaceable sensuality, which does not seem to give rise to quarrels as it does on earth.

Secondly, man, animal and insect are on one level. There can be no excellence of man even if only man can win *mokṣa*, release. Whatever emotion may feel, rationally all are equally insignificant, since atomic plurality by involving identity implies insignificance.

### 13. *Kaṭh. U.* 1/2.20

*aṇor aṇīyān mahato mahīyān | ātmāsyā jaṇtor nihito guhāyām  
tam akraṭuḥ pāsyati vitāsoko | dhātuprasādān mahimānam ātmanāḥ*

The vulgate is « Smaller than the small, greater than the great, the Self of this born creature is placed in the heart/ the Self is placed in the heart of this creature. One without active will beholds him and becomes free from sorrow, when through the grace of the Creator he sees the greatness of the soul/Self ». *guhāyām* is probably best taken as the *ākāśa*/space in the heart. The genitive *asyā jaṇtor* could of course, go with *guhāyām*, in the cavity, secret place of this born creature. *tam* may very well go proleptically with *mahimānam*. Radhakrishnan keeps the difficultior lectio, *dhātu-* for *dhātuḥ*, but *dhātu* does not mean 'mind'. This is a very good example of the possibilities of resuing old material with minimum change: the genitive/ablative ambiguity is used, *ātman* is given the sense of the World-Soul, *jaṇtu* is taken with *guhā*; and if we want a doctrine of grace, insert a *visarga*.

13a. *Kaṭh. U.* 2/1-2 (= 45); the *etaḍ vai tat* verses seem to have begun as a hymn of individual *jīva/puruṣa*, about 450 BC, but have been subsequently redirected by means of commentary verses to the universal *Atman* a generation or two later.

Thirdly, all are essentially the same. The recovery of pure *jīva* is by subtraction, and the perfect *jīva* is not by addition. Hence individuality by qualities can only obscure the ultimate reality of *jīva* and rationally can have no value. The ascetic determinism consequent, especially when it is new, does not make an unhappy creed for those who are on top, the brahmans, real or would-be (i.e. heretics) who are freed from obligation and reproach, just as in Leninism-Stalinism the rulers, also freed from obligation, express individuality by acting, and it is to the subject whose only duty is to obey and suffer happily any consequences, that the doctrine reveals its limitations. In India the escape, within three centuries, is to theism.

Pūraṇa Kāśyapa seems to have held practically the *Ājīvaka* doctrine, in which Maskarin/Makkhalī Gosāla followed him to give it its final form. But Pūraṇa is particularly condemned for his denial of moral action. He is represented as saying that crime had no guilt, and virtue neither merit nor increase of merit. But his reason for this can be that he was a complete determinist, and there can be no merit in involuntary action. Man's action will not alter flow of events, being only part of them; if it has no effect, how can it have merit?

Merit has no effect, therefore there is no reason to suppose it exists or if it does, has any value. Pūraṇa is not denying the continued effect of action, which is an atom of the universal causation, but its initiative and voluntary nature, and therefore its moral effect. The present state of the world is the result of its past state, and full cause of its future, and so *ad infinitum*. Like Buddha, he agrees that causation is strict, but, unlike him, he says that man cannot interfere.

Pūraṇa also accepted a permanence — Buddhists would say an ātman, but a *jīva* is more likely. The *ājīvaka* soul is material, and according to Buddhaghosa it has form (as it should being an atom) and *ādisu kasi-narūpam attā*, =? « In the beginnings the self is having the form of a subject of meditation/having a complete form [and later not?] ». We would suggest that *kasina* is a svarabhakti form of *kr̥ṣṇa*, black. The souls are of different colours according to merit, and the lowest, is *kr̥ṣṇa*, black, the highest super-white. As we have a doctrine of inevitable progress, every soul was in the beginning black.

If one says the soul is material, the hostile can then ask what is its shape. Octagonal or circular are natural and self-contained for an atom; if atoms have such shapes, it is not surprising if they are not in real combination. How can a circle or regular octagon grip anything? But the questioning becomes awkward when concerned with the size of the soul. The *Ājīvakas* defiantly say it is 500 *vojanas*, leagues. It may be that they grow to that size as they approach the white end of the scale<sup>14</sup>. There

14. *Paramatthadīpanī* 3.253. *aṭṭhaṃsa* is Skt. *aṣṭā-aṃsa*, having eight corners, not *-aṃśa*, parts.

is also the question of whether souls are one single atom, or made up of hundreds of *jīva* atoms together. Our difficulty would be that when an atom becomes 500 *yojanas* large, it is intellectually highly divisible. It might be that *yojana* has been deliberately misunderstood, and we should keep literal RigVedic meaning of « thing yoked »; souls are then collections of 500 atoms, with 500 a conventional figure for a great number (cf. Lat. *trecenti*, 300). And the healing of wounds, growing of hair, might support more than one *jīva* atom in the body. One might also ask « How can the indivisible grow »? Basham seems to accept such a plurality, and he may be right, but our own impression from our previous argument would be that we have one *jīva*, not countless; cubes, pyramids, and icosihedra will fill space solidly, but spheres will not and the cubic figure based on the regular octagon is impossible. The *Jains* have tried to evade the difficulties of the *Ājīvaka* doctrine, but only to the extent of avoiding the immediate trap. While their *jīva* is formless and shapeless/uncongealed, *arūpam amūrtam*, it still gets coloured by *karma*, and this would be hard to explain of the immaterial. When *jīva* was frankly material, it is easy to see how material *karma* could cling to it and stain it.

The materiality of *karma* seems to have been commonly believed in the 6th century. Buddhism has traces of it, both in the colour *kasinas*, blue, yellow, red, white (parallel to earth, air fire, water) and possibly in black and white actions. This idea has hitherto been dismissed as quaint, but it is the conclusion of thinkers, and we shall see there is some rationale for it. Collating *BAU* 2/1.19, 4/2.2-3, 4/3.20, *ChU* 8/6.1-3, *KauṣU* 4.19, we find as follows: We must explain the unity of consciousness. For example, we have two eyes, but only one image, two ears but hear one sound; the organs cannot move, but sight, sound, taste, feeling, all come to one's consciousness. Therefore the sense impressions must move, hence they must be material; and this is the meaning of *ākāśah pratiṣṭhā* (the basis is *ākāśa*) applied to the various senses in *BAU* 4/1. But where do the senses move to? The answer is, to the heart (for early peoples did not understand the function of the brain, and certainly could not see it functioning, whereas the activity of the heart is patent). The senses/sense-data reach the heart though very minute channels called *hitā* veins, and they are filled with (one of) five colours. Five is a number that corresponds to an old group of faculties that compose the individual in the *Brāhmanas*, about 9th century, breath, speech, eye/sight, ear/hearing, mind (*manas*). When this group is converted to the usual senses, we need a sixth colour to parallel *manas*. The *Upaniṣads* keep to five; and so did the *Ājīvaka* in the *Pali* sources, but in *Manimekala* they have six, plus the special super-white. The *Jains* have made six. The table below may indicate that the original was five, raised to six and later reduced.

BAU	nīla	lohita	piṅgala	harita	sūkla
ChU	nīla	lohita	piṅgala	—	pīta sūkla
KauṣU	kr̥ṣṇa	—	lohita	piṅgala	—
Ājīvaka	kr̥ṣṇa	nīla	lohita	piṅgala*	harita
Jain	kr̥ṣṇa	nīla	kapota	lohita	—
				harita	—
					sūkla

\* Manimekalai; see Basham, p. 244.

If sense impressions flow onto the soul through channels filled with colour, their staining the soul is understandable (as is the reason for the number of colours corresponding to senses originally). Also understandable is the materiality of *karma*, since as matter these impressions are no more destructible than other atoms. And if they have stained the *jīva*, and it is not dissolved at death, clearly it must carry them into the next life, with their effects. Our desires are conditioned by our senses impressions and what we make of them, by our *manas*, *viññāna*, mind, understanding/discrimination. So action of impressions, dispositions, desires, continues; indeed a doctrine of *karma* applying only to this life is almost a commonplace.

The sense-data flow into the heart, and we should note the Buddhist word *ā-sru*, *āsrava* (Pali *āsava*), is used in BAU 4/2.3, while the Jain *āsrava* is the channel whereby *karma* flows onto the soul. The sense (as opposed to the sense-organ) is made of *ākāśa*, superfine matter. This seems certain, since the materialist Ajita Keśakambalin, c500 B.C., says *ākāśam indriyāni saṁkhamanti*, the senses go to *ākāśa*, their own element, at death. To the orthodox KauṣU 2.14 the breaths (a synonym for the senses) consist of *ākāśa* (*ākāśātmanāḥ*), and in BAU 3/2.13 the *ātman* goes to *ākāśa*. Here rise two ambiguities: firstly, that the distinction between sense and sense-datum is not (clearly) made; and secondly, is the *ātman* in the *ākāśa* in the heart, or is the *ātman* the *ākāśa*?

BAU 4/2 begins with an activating principle, *puruṣa*<sup>15</sup>, in the right eye which unites with that in the left eye in the *ākāśa* in the heart. *Viññānamaya puruṣa*, the agent of discrimination, can only reside in the heart as the point of unity; we meet him in 4/3.7, where the *ātman* is the *viññānamaya* among the breaths or senses. This can only mean he is the *manas*, for that has the function of discrimination, and as a sense, like other senses, must be made of *ākāśa*. If senses are made of *ākāśa*, can they rest in the *ākāśa* in the heart? They would in fact have to be it and this *ākāśa* would not necessarily be the same numerical *ākāśa* all the time. If this is the case, Buddha could easily say the self is not the same self in life; but at death the dissolution must be complete, as there is no reason why the *ākāśa* should remain conglomerated any more than earth (flesh). If the only possible uniter, the *viññānamaya puruṣa*, the *manas*, is *ākāśa*, it must dissolve at death. This is just the position of Ajita

15. The etymology of *puruṣa* is much disputed; the usual root given is *pr*, fill, but one might suggest *pel*, cf. Lat. *pelno/pello*, instigate, drive.

Késakambalin, who follows Prakudha in his atomic theory. And the orthodox Sāyakāyana thought (at least at one time) that he could tolerate this position; for while the senses might make up the *ātman*, and go to *ākāśa*, on death, he saw that if the person is to survive death he must be non-atomic or one; and he thought he had found such a non-atomic entity in the name. *Jains* and *Ājīvakas* chose the unity, orthodoxy ultimately the non-atomic. So too if the *viññāna* is one *ākāśa* atom, we can understand the importance of the *viññāna/manas* at the moment of death to orthodox and heretic alike, owing to atomic indestructibility.

If we regard all sense *ākāśa* as collecting in the heart, being the *ākāśa* in the heart, there is nothing for the *ātman* to be. Thus we practically have Buddhism if we can find a continuum, and Ajita's materialism if we cannot. How can the *viññāna* subject-object of discrimination exist unincorporated? This difficulty might account for the belief such as we have of the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. How long can a *viññāna* last? The problem is that a substratum is a permanent entity surviving change, but if *viññāna* is a compound even of *viññāna* atoms, why should it survive death for a moment? If we separate *manas* from *viññāna* so that *viññāna* discriminates all sense-data, including those of *manas*, it could be held to be not the *ākāśa* the senses are, and so able to transmute. But if so, it is a substratum.

Wijayasekhara has shown<sup>16</sup>, noting the parallel of *viññāna* and *purisa* (*viññāna* and *puruṣa*) in DN 2.325ff, that in early Buddhism the *viññāna* is the surviving factor that enters the next womb. This allows for the importance of the will at death to both orthodox and heretic as determining one's next life. That will is made by *manas* by aid of *viññāna*, and indeed is one's *viññāna*, and this *viññāna*, by the truth of the thus-knower, who is *sat*, must be realized. It is hard for some to separate the sense from the sensing, and the *viññāna* is known by its present decision. Hence if the *viññāna* is the soul, and the soul is *viññānamaya puruṣa*, the activator that forms the *viññāna*, a serialist theory of the self is an easy fallacy. Perception is the knowledge of the knower: but if so, knowing is existence, and the end of perception is the end of existence. *Nirvana* then has the negative content of annihilation, as many conceive.

Some light on this Buddhist *viññāna* may be shed by the fairly early interpolation in BAU 4/4.3, *Mādh.* version<sup>17</sup>. « Only consciousness descends after [into the next womb]; it/the *ātman*, knowing, becomes one

16. JAOS LXXXIV, pp. 254ff. DN 2.63. *viññānaṃ vā hi mātu'kucchiṃ na okkamis-satha api nu kho nāmarūpam mātu'kucchismiṃ samucchissathāti?* No hetam bhante. « If *viññāna* did not descend into the mother's womb, would name and form come to be? » « No, sir ».

17. *saṃjñānam évānvāvakramati | sā eṣā jñāḥ sāvijñāno bhavati*

The vulgate translate *ava-kram* as « depart », immediately after we have been having a series of *ut-kram*, depart. Especially on the *Kāṇva* version, when we have just been told at the end of .2 that the man/*ātman*, no *viññāna*, doesn't have the

having discrimination » [i.e. when there is no content, there is *sañ-jñāna*, once one has a body again, one will have various senses, and there will be discrimination of senses, *vi-jñāna*]. Kāṇva version <sup>18</sup>: « [The *ātman*] becomes having discrimination. Just what has discrimination descends after [into the womb] ». One might think that the *Pali viññāna* has supplanted *saññāna* because, once embodied, the consciousness is always going to have an object, and so be discriminating. The *Pali viññāna* lacks continuity, and is in fact a compound; there is a stream of *viññāna*. One can understand this stream if the *viññāna* is always different because the content is different. This is perhaps clarified by the *viññānaṅghiti/viññānasthiti*, abiding-place or standing-place of *viññāna* applied to meditational states, in which the object of the *viññāna* is unchanging. To the orthodox *BAU* the *ātman* is essentially consciousness even if there is nothing to be conscious of. The transmigrating *ātman* could be consciousness, *sañjñāna*, by contact with an object *viññāna*. But if consciousness must have content, the Buddhist position (momentarily) follows.

The question of *ātman*, soul, self, is central in Indian thought down to the 5th century B.C. There is a historical reason for this, leading to *ātman*'s identification with *brahma*: if everything is separate, we will need a different spell or rite for everything, but if, e.g. all water is under one god, the same rite will do for many. But if it is not the god, but the effecting power, *brahma*, that is the same, control of it will control everything. Control is by knowing, and knowing by being; but this must tempt the intellectual to knowing he is. Buddha therefore was committed to the question « What is *ātman* »? Unfortunately there is no general agreement on what Buddha meant when he taught what; his answers tend to be interpreted in the light of later Buddhism and its situations. So soul and perception tend to be thought of later as immaterial without clear statement of the situation, since, if sense-data are immaterial or of different material, the soul or *viññāna* to be different can be material. But as there is no finer material than *ākāśa*, if the sense-data are *ākāśa* the soul has to become immaterial, which solves the problem of its unity, though not of its qualities. When it is immaterial *ākāśa* can receive its later meaning 'space'.

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power of discrimination, we should ask, « what is making him/it become having discrimination? » (This numbering is the Madhyandina numbering). Translate: « The tip of his heart lights up/In front of his heart a light shines. By that light his *ātman* goes out. From the eye, or the head or the other parts of the body, [the] life follows it as goes out. As life goes out, all the senses follow it ». (Interpolation) 4 (3 Kāṇva) As a caterpillar... etc. The vulgate translates « By that light the *ātman* goes out, by the eye or the head or by other bodily parts ». This ignores that the verb should end the sentence, and the *ātman* is not likely to quit via the buttocks or ribs. Dative or ablative do not mean « through ».

18. *śaviññāno bhavati śaviññānam evānvavakramati*: *śaviññāna* should be one word both times or two words both times, and the subject of both verbs should be the same either way. Supporting our interpretation, we might note that in the *Pali* DN 2.63 the verb used, *okkamissatha*, is just *avara-kram*.



One must remember that Buddha did not set out to become a heretic. He had presumably an ordinary upbringing, and when his son (necessary for the family rites) was of an age at which he could fairly be expected to survive, and would be handed over to the men for training, Buddha took to religion, seeking the *ātman* in the usual way, by austerity<sup>18a</sup>. It may be that he was not psychic; his austerities were extreme, but he did not experience himself as *ātman/brahma*. But while he was trying the austerities, there must also have been an intellectual train in motion, and we suggest that he may have found the insufficiency of his intellectual basis. Prakudha may have removed *ātman* himself; but at any rate *Sāyakāyana* had emptied it of positive content. It might be known in deep sleep, (BAU 4/3), but what was it? It had no senses, was beyond sense; it had no *manas*, for that is just another sense; hence it was beyond volition, emotion, the things that make us individual; it was beyond duality. It was just consciousness, but consciousness of nothing since there was nothing to be conscious of. How then, Buddha might ask, can we know it? If the knowing is the known and *vice versa*, the orthodox *ātman* is the one conception where this makes sense; but if preceiving needs an (other) object, then this, *ātman* cannot be known. Buddha's idea is parallel to Berkeley's rejection of matter; since Berkeley held matter was by definition unknowable, he claimed it was an unnecessary entity in explaining the universe. Buddha's *ātman* is in a similar position. He therefore denied an *ātman*, and instead of events resting on a substratum unknowable by definition, he left them as their own substratum. But it seems to be extended to things too. And this is atomic: if atomic things are always changing, and *ātman*, *manas*, or whatever is atomic, then how should they have more permanence?

Now we are taught to understand that Buddha's rejection of *ātman* was unique. This is not clear. Certainly I would incline to think that the core of the Buddhist *anātmavāda*, denial of a self, is the denial of the human *ātman*, and it is only extended to that of things. But in the human situation of the 6th century B.C. there might be several entities

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18a. The only date that will fit all the evidence, including the Greek invasion of Demetrius, for Buddha's *Nirvana* is 486 BC. Buddha was therefore born in 566/5, and renounced the world in 536. This date can be supported by the name of his son Rāhula, who should be born on a day of eclipse. Oppolzer's catalogue of eclipses shows an annular one passing over Bihar on 31 July 541 BC. Rāhula would then be conceived in 542, and be handed over to the men at the usual age of six (by Indian count), when he could be expected to have survived infantile mortality, in 536. The idea of Buddha deploring the birth of a son, especially a first son, is grotesque in Indian society. But he had been married at 19 (our 18) in 548, if not after *upanayana*: it is therefore probable that he had lost children; we hear of no daughters or other son, and he may have continued to lose babies after 541. This may also throw light on life being pain. Buddha was said to have determined on his career under the Buddha Kāśyapa; this was also denied as a heresy. I would not be surprised if it was under Pūrāna Kāśyapa that he began, considering the closeness of early Buddhism to the doctrine of Prakudha Kātyāna, and Buddha's reported meeting with Pūrāna before his Enlightenment.

to make up the soul. The thinkers were finding that these overlapped, and the ultimate upshot was that the various schools ended with one. But the denial of one entity might leave still two permanent entities in the 6th century. So BAU uses *puruṣa* and *ātman*, but seems to have dropped *jīva*, and it may be significant of the ultimate connection of Buddha (through Prakudha)? with BAU that his doctrine is an *anātma-vāda*, not an *a-jīva/apuruṣa-vāda*. The Jains and *Ājīvakas* have a permanent *ātman*, but their word is *jīva*, and we would not be surprised if their word *appā/attā* is a reintroduction from orthodoxy of the term or indeed that its importance in classical Indian philosophy is due to the growing popularity of *Vedānta*, which triumphs with Sankara. Some *Sāṃkhya* preferred the *puruṣa*, which is more fundamental than the various *ātman*s, *jīva ātman*, *mahant*, *ātman*, *bhūtātman* (all of which may be the same). Then there is *pudgala*. To the Jain this is matter, and the phenomenal world as *jīva* in contact with *pudgala* is practically different words for the *Sāṃkhya puruṣa* in contact with *prakṛti*. The Buddhists also knew *pudgala*, and some believed that it was the substratum of transmigration. Their view is fiercely attacked in our sources as an *ātma-vāda*, but it may well have been misunderstood by the time these sources were written, for the Jain *pudgala* is destructible and has qualities. It can be in greater or smaller aggregates, of which the greatest is *skandha*; and if *viññāna* is a *skandha* of *pudgala*, then perhaps it could transmigrate in the course of a temporally limited career, even though we have no argument given against its immediate dissolution on human death.

The difficulties about What is the nature of soul? reārise when there is more than one *jīva* atom in the body; when there is only one, as for the Jains, it must be the transmigrating entity, and it only remains to be isolated from all other atoms, being indestructible. But if we have many water or earth atoms, why only one *jīva* atom? If there are more than one, they are just part of the *skandha*, and the question of the nature of the transmigrating entity, of the self, arises again.

But while asking whether Buddha in disposing of brahmanic *ātman* left anything that could be permanent, one might suggest that he left the name. It may be the *viññāna* that transmigrates, but if it is its (always different) object, the name continues, the same. Buddha does not deny *karman*, indeed, he very strongly asserts the results of the act (which term includes thought and desire). *Karma* must be just, which is impossible in pure (absurd) serialism; if it is not just, annihilation can be the only aim of life, and we have the position of Pūraṇa Kāśyapa that good acts do not increase or bad acts decrease merit. Annihilation is not justice, and if Buddha denies all permanent entity, how can *nirvāṇa*, the cessation of movement, be other than annihilation? If *nirvāṇa* is unconditioned existence, it is practically the brahmanic *Ātman* whose *suṣupti*, deep sleep, is beyond consciousness. In this case Buddha's quarrel with orthodoxy is not eschatological but verbal (the proper description of the process) and methodical primarily. The *brahman* might say the *ātman*

is him, he/the *ātman* being the continuing potentiality/essence of consciousness, and Buddha would be saying this *ātman* is ineffable, and by becoming it, one is-and-is-not (not « one is and one is not »). Our suggestion that the name might be regarded as the *viññāna* may draw this support, that *viññāna/viññāna* only ceases to manifest itself in *nirvāna*. We might see this idea in *Suttanipāta* 1074<sup>19</sup>: « As a flame overthrown by movement of the wind « goes west » and does not come under definition, so the ascetic freed from name and body « goes west », and not come under definition ». The atoms of flame, fire, do not cease to exist, the flame does not cease to exist, but is no longer active and manifested. So identity with such an *ātman/nirvāna* would meet Buddha's assertion that he does not teach annihilation or eternity; the self would be the same and different from *Nirvāna*.

One difficulty about deciding what Buddha really taught is that, if one is not a Buddhist, his teaching must be reduced to a plain error, which it is hard to believe Buddha would not have seen. But what is plain error to us may not have been so plain on the presuppositions available to the Buddha. We find in the Pali an analysis of the individual rather like that of the modern serialist, with the important difference that the series is physical, not abstract; it flows on, *ā-sru*, and the object of Buddhism is to stop the flows by obstruction, *ni-rodha*. There is a continuing series of converging awarenesses, which by existing cause further continuance of similarly converging awarenesses. There is clearly never a complete break, for men continue to say « I ». One can see from this that awareness is central, hence we can easily understand the position of *viññāna* and its role as transmigrator. But these awarenesses are caused by desire: the word has creative power, so that formulation, analysis leading to understating, *viññāna*, should be creative too, *viññāna* knows the volition, conation of *manas*, and imagines there is a self, *ātman*.

BAU in 2/4 (=4/5) of c. 580 has already seen and asserted that all desires are for the self, not for the sake of the desired party, even when the desire is the *Ātman*. And if we believe the *Samyuttanikaya* 1.74. Prasenajit's wife (fl. 510) must have read this, for she refused to believe anything dearer to her than herself. BAU 4/4 might have said there is no point in desiring for an *ātman* that cannot experience, but it is not explicit beyond indicating the superiority of him who is beyond desire. Since desires are for the self, if we can see that there is no such a thing as the self, we will cease to desire. It might be said that if there is any permanent entity we can desire for it; but this permanent entity must be conscious, and

19. *accī yathā vātavegena khitto | attham paleti na upeti saṅkham  
evam muni māmakāyā vimutto | attham paleti na upeti saṅkham*

One might translate « freed from the body that we know », the named body, but the name is separate from the body in the Buddhist definition, and the *viññāna* is not the body.

this would not apply to *jīva* or *puṭgala* or the later brahmanic *ātman*. Sāyakāyana's *ātman* could desire if it wanted to, and only on attaining no-desire did it become brahman. Buddha holds uncompromisingly that since all desire is for an *ātman*, a conscious entity that is expecting to enjoy the fruition of the desire, yet desire is the cause of pain; we shall never have freedom from pain till we cease to desire, i.e., renounce the idea of a self. The idea of renouncing self for something greater does not occur, largely because of the static nature and inactive pure being of the only possible greater Buddha would know, the brahmanic *Ātman*. One cannot renounce one's self for a God who does not love; and for a God/god who does love, such a renunciation is not a denial but a sublimation.

We therefore find analysis of the self that admit no *ātman*, self. There is a body, *kāya*, and consciousness, *viññāna*, or their synonyms *nāmarūpa*, name and form, and *citta*, mind (literally, what is preceived). Variation in terms in the traditions is doubtless due to attempts at better definition in light of continuing philosophical development. But these all assert that the mental is a more permanent/important part of a man than the physical; the immaterial rather than the material atoms is what we mean when we name him, and we can speak of a man long after he is dead, when we do not mean his body at all. But we must remember that the name in Buddha's time is a much realer entity than it is to us; it partakes the magic nature of the word (and was given in a solemn ceremony); it cannot be unnamed any more than a word can be unsaid. So when a hero desires or boasts that his name will be remembered, this is more than the gratification of present vanity; his soul/name will be aware of it. We might remember that the name is the glory of a fighting class, from which Buddha sprung, even if it is not capable of sensual experience like an *ātman*. So when the name comes to mean what we mean by name, just vocable wavelengths, and the magical nature of speech is taken over by *śabda*, then the satisfactory transmigrating agent is removed, and Buddhism never got one to replace it. This process would be made harder by the change of the sense of *ātman* to the common use of Pali *attā*, Pkt, *appā*, it becoming the whole self rather than a psychological part (probably its connection with breath accounts for the original promotion of the term).

The Buddhist line against permanence and anything that might suggest permanence hardens. The tendency of thought is to analysis, separation and specialization; so *rūpa* gets more confined to physical forms, and *ākāśa* comes to mean «space». This quite upsets the balance in *nāmarūpa*; when *ākāśa* was atomic, all sense impressions (including those of *manas*) could come under *rūpa*, leaving *nāma* the name of their particular collection. But once *ākāśa* means space, *rūpa* is reduced to the body, so that *nāma* has to be the other four collections, bundles, *skandha* (politely translated «aggregates»), namely: *vedanā*, feeling, (especially pleasure and pain, which suggests acknowledgement of a problem in Prakudha's atomic status for them); *sañña/samjñā*, perception by sense

or mind; *saṃskāras*, dispositions, (literally, « compounds », especially psychic, as habits, qualities, etc.); and lastly *viññāna*, the discriminating judging faculty (intellectual, not moral). We might see a trace of charging meanings in the Pali phrase *ākāśena gacchati*, « he goes through the air »; but it could mean/have meant « he goes by means of *ākāśa* »; the Jain *ākāśa* is that which gives room to make motion possible.

One might ask, « If *nāma*, name, is the transmigrating agent, how do we get rid of selfishness by denying *ātman* »? In so far as the name is the *viññāna* that (*viññāna*), being identified with its object, loses all permanence, though one might ask, « Why not work for the series »? But the answer could lie in the inactivity/non-consciousness of *nāma* in its narrower and proper sense. We may mean a man's character, soul, ideas by his name in common use, but such feelings or knowledge cannot be said to be inherent in (as opposed to adherent to) the name. The name can never be de-created; consequently freed from desire and consequent action, it will automatically rest in Nirvana, not to return to the memory of man. In fact, just as in property we assert ourselves, of things, and in selling or renouncing deny them as part of ourselves, so with our character: we are the actions and views we do not repudiate. If we repudiate all action, including thought, we will have *Nirvana*, or the *ātman* of BAU 2/4, save that last more consciously retains its powers (of perception).

We may now hope to understand the Buddhist causal chain that explains life. It has received elaboration, but rather in form than content (1) Ignorance (of the Buddhist truth that there is no self) leads to (2) compounds, *saṃskāra*, dispositions. Presumably ignorance is not a mere vacuum, but rather the collective term for any wrong view, a view on the matter of having a self, *ātman*, being inevitable. The idea being its content/the word or discrimination being creative, the compounds, collections of perceptions and dispositions, are gathered together in fact. We can see how easily the *Mādhyamika* idea of *śūnyatā*, emptiness, can be deduced from the initial of the causal chain. But any perception even if it is its perceiver, needs/has this active side, the perceiving, namely (3) *viññāna*, discrimination, the act or tool of discriminating. The compounds make an individual, and we have seen that the core of the individual was the *viññāna*, which transmigrated. We therefore have a reassertion in (4) *nāmarūpa*, name and form, rather than a cause of the individual, though *viññāna* could be regarded as the cause of things in general (which are the objects of perceptions). But it is rather here the individual that is being thought of, since it is the individual that has (5) the six sense organs. So far we have had logical rather than temporal causation, for one would have thought it was the *viññāna* that was ignorant, unless we say ignorance causes (the belief in = the fact of) individuality. But in this third description of the individual as *nāmarūpa*, one could say that the body is prior to the six senses. The temporal sequence continues and the senses are the cause of/means (i.e., material cause) of (6) *sparsā*, contact, with objects of sense. This contact causes (7) *vedanā*, feeling,

which results in (8) *trṣṇā*, thirst, craving for sensual experience. This causes (9) *upādāna*, taking to one's self, grasping. This is exactly the word used in BAU 4/4.4 in the simile of death. « As the goldsmith, taking to himself a piece of gold, makes a more beautiful form, so the soul ... makes himself another more beautiful form... ». We have here the power of the will, *viññāna*, at death once again; this creative power of the will/word may well be the result of the influence of the magical world so real to the Vedic Indian and his distant predecessor, the Indo-European. The result of this taking to one's self at death is, of course, that the wish one was making is fulfilled, which causes (10) *bhava*, becoming; this need not be quite the same as conception, and the difference will account for still-births and miscarriage, presumably very common. The *Nikāya* said, « Did not *viññāna* descend into the mother's womb... » (cf. Nota 16) and this is the successful birth. The taking to one's self is not the cause of the parents' physical coition, but of another life commencing with them. This becoming, descent of *viññāna*, does cause (11) *jāti*, birth (also with implication of caste) which is certainly a cause as the prerequisite of those miseries (at least to a fighting class), (12) old age and death. These ought to be the cause of ignorance, but it is hard to see how.

We may note the suddenness and apparent arbitrariness with which the physical appears in the chain; the physiological is dropped, perhaps because it was so generally agreed as to cause no argument, and the result is a rapid transition to abstract thinking. The physiological is left to physicians if they want it, but the philosophers do not.

Since there is an impossibility of being becoming not-being, any activity, feeling, perception, volition, or assertion, could not cease to cause without an act of volition, a creative atc. How such an act does come into being is not clear, but it does involve a denial of determinism, which the *Ājīvakas*, probably logically, refuse to make, except that since *nirvāṇa* (or whatever it is to be called) is a static reality, if it is or is to be actualized in an individual, such an act must evolve in the course of determinism. Here the *Ājīvakas* are logical, especially against a background of cyclic cosmology. They assert that after due and appointed quantities of incarnations everyone will reach *nirvāṇa*; progress is certain if not meritorious, and slow — but there has been no guilt.

The idea that everyone will finally progress to salvation seems unique to the *Ājīvakas* in early times. As a materialist hypothesis it is not unreasonable since, the soul being matter, all matter tends to rest, non-action; and matter even tends to settle perceptibly to our sensefaculties, in order (consider a pot of water, where the sediment settles). Nor is the belief in causation shaken by believing in some very peculiar causes; e.g., whatever may be achieved by magic, matter itself is under determinism. Determinism follows from materialism (at least until Planck) and it is significant that the substantiation of the atomic theory in the 19th century greatly encouraged « scientific » determinism (es a religious belief). Such



universal salvation should be accepted if the universe is truly cyclic, as it is to the *Jains*. But they lay no stress on it and do not seem interested enough even to deny it, for while there is some interest in the *duṣama* *susama* era that will follow the *duṣama* *duṣama* after our own *duṣama*, which is bad enough, to a people with such a low opinion of man and human nature better times are too remote to be other than virtually mythical. The wishful thinking of India rather sees things as always going from bad to worse: and you never really need to care both because of the unreality of life and the possibility of *nirvāṇa* in any human incarnation — for example, now.

Keith was willing to interpret the verse in *Dīghanikāya* 2.157<sup>20</sup> (16/6.10) as envisaging the possibility of universal *mokṣa*, but it could just be poetic enthusiasm, and he stresses that the later doctrine of the *Hinayāna* does not believe it. Possibly worrying about other people (mostly as yet hypothetical) is irrelevant to making an end of (one's own) pain. Universal salvation may be an extension of the idea of a saviour, the Buddhist *Maitreya* in the last centuries B.C. improved on by the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara of the *Mahāyāna*, with his vow not to enter his Buddhahood until all creatures in the innumerable universes had been saved (not necessarily by their making progress). This consummation, devoutly to be wished, would seem to be in little likelihood of fulfilment but for the benevolent undertaking of Avalokiteśvara. It could be argued that the cycle of Brahma cannot be fulfilled until all have reached *nirvāṇa/ātman*, both since they are part of *brahma*, and also that otherwise many will be cut off in the flower of their wickedness in a world no worse than ours, in an uncompleted and therefore imperfect cycle. But with the Indian lack of faith in human nature, there is no living interest in the wicked also being part of the *brahma*. Instead, *parallel* with the growth of theism, the accumulating emotional impatience of society borrows from Zoroastrianism finality by fire, which in Vedantic terms, since all the qualified is essentially false, is the destruction/retraction of the universe.

In a purely idealistic universe free-will is dubious, for who is to have it? In a purely materialistic universe it is either unnecessary or impossible. So the determinists of the 19th century tended to be scientific mate-

20. *sabbe 'va nikkhipissanti | bhūtā loke samussayam*

*yathā etādiso Satthā | loke appaṭipuggalo*

*Tathāgato balappatto | sambuddho parinibbuto*

« All, as it were, who come into being in this world, will throw off the burden, like the Teacher, who is of this kind, without a rival in the world, who has thus/ correctly gone, having become strong, fully enlightened, dissolved in nirvana ». Thus the vulgate. *va* can as easily be *iva* as *eva*. Could *a-prati-pudgala* be « not-involved in *pudgala*/matter »? The Buddha on nirvana has now left the world, and this would make good sense. The change of meaning would occur on the lapse of old controversies. I also find *balappatta* = having attained strength hard to understand in the context here of *nirvāṇa*. Translated as *bala-prāṭṭa*, « having his (physical) strength taken » we have simple sense without hagiography.

rialists. The *Ājivakas* also had accepted a material soul. This is elaborated by the materialists, *Lokāyatas*, later *Cārvākas*, whose prototype should be Ajita Keśakambalin<sup>21</sup>. His relation to Prakudha Kātyāyana is not clear, but as his doctrine is known also by the Jains, he should be later.

Ajita reduces Prakudha's seven elements to the usual four coarse elements (*mahābhūṭiko ayam puriso*) and the fine *ākāśa*; he agrees with Jains that the soul is the size of the body, but holds it literally. One might suspect that it is the *ākāśa* in the compound, and certainly at death, whether the soul is *ākāśa* or air, its unity is broken, and (it) no longer exists. Why Ajita should be an ascetic, as is indicated by his hairblanket (*keśa-kambala*), is not said, but we have suggested the reason is the acquisition for use of magic powers; his belief that the body is the soul has good orthodox ancestry, so that his tapas is also inherited, and need not have been a permanent way of life but have been assumed *ad hoc*. He may be best regarded as a wandering brahman teacher. Ajita's position on free-will is also unrecorded. On our second suggestion for *opapātika* in our note, he would be a determinist; on our first, he might well be a hedonist, whose hedonism, like that of Epicurus, was coarsened by his later disciples, the classical *Cārvākas*, who made the

21. DN ii 23 I p. 55.

*natthi mahārāja dīmaṃ natthi yīṭṭhaṃ natthi hutam natthi sukaṭadukkaṭānāṃ kammānāṃ phalaṃ vipāko natthi ayaṃ loko natthi paro loko natthi mātā natthi pitā natthi sattā opapātikā natthi loke samaṇabrahmaṇā sammaggatā ye imaṃ ca lokaṃ paraṃ ca lokaṃ sayam abhiññā sacchikaṭvā pavedenti*

It is fairly clear that his doctrine has been misrepresented in the Buddhist account; a materialist who says this world does not exist (*natthi ayaṃ loko*) is a contradiction in terms. I suspect that the phrase should be in the locative and go somehow with the preceding, saying there is no maturation of karma in this world or the next. Similarly when he says that there is neither father nor mother nor creatures that are self-generated, it is clear that any sense behind these statements is being greatly distorted. We can suggest that *opapātikā* (plural) goes with everything from *ayaṃ loko*, and what is being said is that life in this or any other world is not a result of or itself a misdemeanour, « This world is not, the next world is not, (being) a father is not, (being) a mother is not, (neing) a creature is not causing a sin/connected with a sin ». This translation takes *opapātika* from *aupapātika*, connected with a secondary sin, from *upapātaka*. But one could take the word from *upapata* = accident (*Kat.S.S.*) or occurrence, and in this case the sentiment is determinism, that none of these things are fortuitous. This may be what the vulgate translation, « arisen/reborn without visible cause », is trying to say. If the word is from *upapatti*, there is no reason against Pali *opapattika*. The Buddhist Sanskrit is given as *upapāduka*, self-generated (i.e. these things are caused). Why Ajita talks about *para loka*, the next world, is not clear, but it would have a place in a cyclic view of creation. It could be that we should punctuate after *hutam*, and *vipāko natthi* is a gloss, and we translate: « This world is not, the next world is not the fruit of good or bad deeds; there is no father, mother or being met by chance in the world, or 'saintly'/rightly-gone *brahman* who well knows of this world and the next from personal experience ». (Should *satthā*, teacher, be the proper reading of *sattā*, beings? One remembers the brahmanic triad, father, mother and teacher). Or if the vulgate translation is correct, « neither what is given, sacrificed, ... this world or the next, mother or father ... exists », could this be the religious deduction from Prakudha's atoms which are in no real contact with one another?

most of the diminishing asset of sensual enjoyment. The *Jains* lay such charges in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 2/1.17-19. But if good and bad perish alike, without distinctive recognition, the question of free-will cannot be of much significance. Ajita might well have been able to accept upaniṣadic passages in their amoralistic sense. And the slow development of personal ethics in all cultures may well have been due to the dull afterlife for the masses of humanity, those without souls, i.e. everyone except kings and priests.

*Karma* determines; but while other (non-materialist) sects need an act of volition to begin emancipation from *karma*, there can be no guarantee of such an act, and indeed there must always be the danger of falling back, as illustrated by Buddhist story of Godhika, who killed himself to make sure he did not fall from *arhatship* again. Indeed Professor Wagle [*op. cit.*] suspects he was not unique, and that there were religious suicides not only amongst the *Jains*, but among the Buddha's earliest disciples. The question, « could an arhat fall? » proved very troublesome at the council of Vaiśālī in 386.

It is very likely the realization that materialism involves determinism which caused the *Jains* to change their *jīva*, soul, to the immaterial, although it must be admitted, in a very half-hearted way. For *karma* remains material, and is indeed rather like a medical infection — an attack of *karma* is much like its manifestation, an attack of measles. The division of material and immaterial does not lead any great result in Jainism as it did in *Sāṃkhya*, and the material is systematized rather crudely. It is called *puḍgala*, and has colour, smell, taste, form and touch; these get subdivided and combined till we have 560 brands, all *puḍgala*. The world comes into being through the contact of *jīva* and *puḍgala* by the forces of motion, rest, time, and space. So a creator is an unnecessary hypothesis. The upaniṣadic verb is *srj*, emit, evolve, rather than *kr*, do, make, or *dhā*, create, place, which would be more personal verbs). We should by this theory be back at a determinist materialism; and *karma* is indeed inexorable. It would seem that the only free-will possible is the withdrawal from action, the refusal to act — in effect the possibility of becoming an ascetic. This should also be the Buddhist position and, logically, ultimately the orthodox.

*Puḍgala* is known also to (some) Buddhists, the *Vātsīputras*, continued in the *Sammitīya* sect. The division of the sects is obscure, but the first split in 386 B.C. is into the *Mahāsaṅghikas* and *Sthavira/Theravādins* i.e., the Majority versus the Conservatives. One of the important points in the dispute is whether to recognize the by-now developed money-economy by accepting money as alms. The *Vātsīputras* are said to have arisen from the *Sthaviravādins* in the 3rd century after the *Nirvana*, which might suggest as a result of Aśoka's council at Pāṭaliputra in 258 B.C. The *Vātsīputras* come then from the conservatives (and may represent the less pliable among them), so that the doctrine of *puḍgala* is as likely a conservatism, possibly misunderstood, as an innovation. Though the clas-

sical Buddhists reject *pudgala* on the ground that it would be just another name for a permanent *ātman*, the Jains regard karma as made of it, and if this were also true of the Buddhist's *skandhas*, feeling, consciousness, etc., which are in fact (at least the cause of) our *karma*, the *Vātsīputras* could legitimately have held it to be different and not-different from the *skandhas*. There is in fact no need to think of *pudgala* as permanent unless it is the same conglobation of *pudgala* that carries the soul/karma into transmigration: *viññāna* or *nāma*, could be regarded as made of it if it is in perpetual flux.

The Buddhist concept of *pudgala* might have been an attempt to adapt or react to the *Sāṃkhya* concept of the *liṅga-śarīra* which merely carried the soul, *puruṣa*, which carried the *karma*; through transmigration, but did not experience it. Buddhism, heresies, and orthodoxy must interact, yet it is interesting to note how they try to avoid one another's language. It may be that part of the difference of terms is due to the difference of (Vedic) schools, but part of the difference is likely to be chronological, since a successful term will spread. As for differences in the orthodox *Sāṃkhya*, *sāṃkhyā* was probably the general word for philosophy down to the 2nd century B.C., and the six conventional schools had not differentiated; but the teachers who contributed must have come from all Vedas.

The *Sarvāstivādin* Buddhists also have a conservative lineage; they too seem to have known *pudgala*, but on refining the idea they needed another term. To them material things are made out of atoms, *aṇu*, which consist of groups of seven particles, *paramāṇu*, infra-small. (The number seven reminds one of Prakudha, and suggests a position in which all molecules contained one of each atoms: this raises the question of how elements differ, and the *Sarvāstivādin* answer by the predominance of the qualities of one element, the others being present. The *Sāṃkhya* arrange elements in order of density, of which the lightest only has the quality for one sense — *ākāśa* has sound only, — while the heaviest has those for all five senses. This is rather parallel to the Jain idea of one-sense, two-sense, up to five-sense *jīvas*). Though the Buddhist *paramāṇu* rests on a substratum of colour, smell, touch, and taste (which I take to mean that only in the atom, *aṇu*, are such qualities manifested), it is itself invisible, intangible, untastable, indivisible, unanalysable, but it is not permanent, but flashes into being and presumably out of it (this seems to be a dogmatic assertion not given proof, to avoid any possibility of an *ātman*). The Jain *pudgala* also can be destroyed. Thus the Buddhists have divided the qualities of *pudgala* between the *aṇu* and *paramāṇu*, the atom and the particle.

The particle, as we have said, is beyond any sensing; that is, it is *avyakta*, not manifested; and this term we find in early *Sāṃkhya*. According to Johnston, its original function there is only what it does through the *guṇas*, qualities, i.e. it is in effect their substratum. These *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* cannot be separated from the colours we met

before; *sattva* (truth, beingness) is always connected with *śukla*, white; *rajas* (passion, root *raj*, be red) is *r/lohita*; and *tamas* (darkness) black, *kr̥ṣṇa*. These by their admixtures determine the *karma*, and so condition the next life, *avyakta* has been a more successful term than *ākāśa*, which evidently was changing its meaning at a critical time; but the *Sāṃkhya* souls and passions have been material, and the souls could be stained with the material at one time. This position should be valid for the post-Jina 5th century B.C., but it might have been felt valid right down to the rise of the *Sarvāstivāda*. In *ChU* 6/1-6, being evolved itself into water, heat and food and made each of them threefold with the white, red and black forms, *śukla*, *rohita*, *kr̥ṣṇa*, i.e. with the (*Sāṃkhya*) *guṇas* <sup>22</sup>.

We have a *Sāṃkhya* from the same world as Jainism in *Kaṭhā Upaniṣad* (1/3.3 & .10-11. « Know the body is a chariot, the self owns it/is the warrior of the two-man team; the intelligence is the actual driver, and *manas* the bridle [with its conative and emotional side] ». In .10-11, « Beyond the sense-organs are the content(s) of sensing <sup>23</sup>, and beyond the contents is the mind, *manas*; beyond the mind is the intelligence, *buddhi*, and beyond the *buddhi* the great self ». This must be the owner of the chariot. Johnston took that as the *jīva*, life-soul, but this has not qualities beyond life, save in the systems where it absorbs the *ātman/puruṣa*. But a great self implies that there was a smaller self, and that one would expect to be the *jīva/prāṇa* (life-soul). We can therefore take the great self to be the *ātman* of orthodoxy. It was a substratum. Evidently all these are material, because they are based on the *avyakta*: beyond the great self is the impalpable, the *avyakta*, the *Sāṃkhya* improvement on *ākāśa/pudgala*. In the later *Sāṃkhya prakṛti*, original substance, is the term substituted, and what is absent here from the later is essentially the account of the tangible physical world, the early interest being in salvation, not science.

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22. This *Chāndogya* passage needs interpretation, but it is not early. It might be as early as the 5th century, or archaizing in the 2nd. *ChU* 6 does not give clear signs of being known, except possibly to the very late *Maitrāyaṇi Upaniṣad*.

23. *Indriyebhyaḥ parā (hy) arthāḥ | arthebhyas ca param manasḥ manasaś ca parā buddhir | buddher ātmā mahān paraḥ*

The usual translation « object of sense » for *artha* is not satisfactory here, since *artha* must be between the sense-organ and the mind; we suggest something like « the content of sensing », the act of sensing perhaps. If the sense-organ and the sense-impression are originally material, these two could answer to the body; or we might have the power of sensing (like the *puruṣa* in the eye of the early *BAU*), and the sense-data, which move down to the *manas* which is in the heart; *manas* becomes subordinated to *viñāna*, which must be represented here by *buddhi*. (So *viñāna* is different from *manas* in *BAU* 4/4.5.) *viñāna* originally knew separately; i.e. from the impressions brought to it through the eye, etc., via mind it discriminated the decision, « this is a horse », and so on. The word may have become imprecise, or too extroverted, and *buddhi*, the power of forming and retaining concepts and general notions, might be felt a more active word. One might notice that *buddhi* is not a psychological word in Buddhism, doubtless because of the reverence of the participle, *Buddha*, and its connotations.

But beyond the impalpable *avyakta* is *puruṣa*; there is nothing beyond *puruṣa*. It is the goal, it is the highest place/state of going<sup>24</sup>. In this context it is hard not to take the words as referring to a universal *puruṣa* and this is reinforced by the following .12-13; even if their authenticity is impugned, when Johnston (op. cit. p. 53) says that except for *Kaṭha*, *puruṣa* is the universal one in early *Sāmkhya* of the *Gīta* and *Svetāśvatara*, he is correct for *Kaṭha* 2 (= 4-6), which was a separate composition (cf. Note 13<sup>a</sup>) of the 5th century B.C. But certainly in the parallel passage to 1/1.10 *Kaṭha* 2/3.7-8 (= 6.7-8) the *puruṣa* is the universal one. How or where then do we find the idea of multiplicity of *puruṣas*?

We might think of two sources; firstly the atomic. The Jain soul may not be *pudgala*, matter, but the innumerable quantity of atoms composing it certainly derives from Prakudha's atoms of life. Secondly it may be that the utter passivity of *ātman* was not satisfactory; it needs a force to make it act; and here we might remember the *puruṣa* in the eye etc.

24. 3.11 mahataḥ param avyaktam | avyaktāt puruṣaḥ paraḥ  
puruṣān na paraṁ kiṁ cit sā kāṣṭhā sā parā gatih

In this last phrase there might be a trace of the old Aryan sport of chariot-racing; *kāṣṭhā* also means the place for racing as well as the goal. Chariot-racing was especially a *kṣatriya* sport, and it seems to have predeceased the old families in India.

25. (.12) I certainly suspect of being interpolated. Its *ātman* is the universal *ātman*, just referred to (in vulgate order) as *puruṣa*, and if it is the individual, that having just been described as the enjoyer, can hardly be unknown save to thought.

eṣa sarveṣu bhūteṣu gūḍho'tmā na prakāśate  
drśyate tv agryayā buddhyā sūkṣmayā sūkṣmadarśibhiḥ

*gūḍho'tmā* is an irregular sandhi that only occurs here and in the Epic (MBh 1-3 according to Monier-Williams), that is considerably after the date of c475 to which we would assign the early *Kaṭha* 1 (= 1-3). We suspect that there has been a displacement. .10-11 should follow the analogy of the chariot, which ends in .4, in which verse *indriya* occurs twice, thus providing relevance for *indriyebhyaḥ* in 1. 10. If we transfer .5-9 with the contrast between the fool without self-control and the intelligent man with it, before .13, we have a good relevance to the plea for restraint in that verse, *yacched vāḥmanasī prajñas | tad yacchej jñāna ātmani | jñānam ātmani mahati (niyacched) | tad yacched chānta ātmani*. This looks like a reused verse; *vāḥmanasī* is dual, and does not properly make *tad*, singular. Radhakrishnan prints this but translates *vācam manasī*, and the *manas* would make a good *tad*. We need *jñāna* and *śānta* to scan; the former could be taken as locative in sandhi, but the latter is easier as nominative. But from the phrasing one does want a locative rather than a dual accusative, speech and mind, and *manasī* still scans — — here. Again, no *ātman* should be *tad* (neuter). The third *pada* would scan better as:

jñānam ātmānam mahati niyacched | iḥ an original triṣṭubh.

What we want is « Let the wise man suppress them/sense-data in *manas*, let him suppress that in the knowing self (*buddhi*), the knowing self in the great self; that being at peace let him suppress in the *ātman* ». What .13 seems to say is « Let the wise man suppress mind and speech; thus let him suppress them in the knowing self. Knowledge/the knowing (self) in the great self thus let him suppress, being at peace in the *ātman* ». Johnston wonders [op. cit., p. 50] why *sattva* in certain passages (e.g. MBh 12/203.33) is the same as the *buddhi*. The reason should be through *vijñāna* which we saw transmigrating, and so becoming a creature, *sattva*.

So in *Kaṭhā* U. 2/1.12-13 (= 4.12-13) we find a thumb-sized *puruṣa* stands in the middle of the *ātman*, and this is repeated in 2.3.17 (= 6.17), where it is *antarātman*, in the *atman*, and in the heart. Thus the *ātman* is used here too for the individual.

We suspect this sort of development for *Sāṃkhya*; since it is orthodox, brahma should remain in some term or other in the majority of its sects. Why the term *brahma* should not have sufficed is hard to say; Brahma is becoming an important god in the early Formative period. But it may be to emphasize that the universe is being thought of as a single organism, and the cosmic *puruṣa* is Brahma's activating principle, just as later the *śakti* overshadows its divine owner. It could be that with the separation of matter from non-matter, an impelling, activating principle is more appropriate and *puruṣa*, impeller, pervader is a suitable term. The great self or the *jīva* would both do for the individual; if they are different, the *jīva* would have to be the individual *puruṣa*, and the great self would disappear owing to the difficulty of finding its utter passivity something necessary and unique to do. But it would seem that the word *puruṣa* is only finally transferred to the individual when or where a universal *puruṣa* is denied. The *ātman* is basically material, and so soluble on death; beyond it is *avyakta*, *pudgala*, matter, which formed the *karma*<sup>26</sup>. If it was the combination of *pudgala* that transmigrated, we would have a *skandha*, and be very near Buddhism. But if there is only material, we would come to determinism; it is then the *jīva* (later *puruṣa*) that transmigrates; but it must carry the *avyakta* for *karma* to have effect. As the term *avyakta* yields to *prakṛti*, and becomes generalized (perhaps owing to the development of physical cosmological as opposed to psychological speculation), we find *karma* is carried by the *liṅgaśarīra*, mark-body, to which the *jīva/puruṣa* is bound till liberation. This is the sole function of the *liṅgaśarīra*, which affords a good instance of the analytic cycle; analysis robs an entity of content so that it is dropped as meaningless; then we find another entity has to be asserted, which undergoes the same cycle. The *Sāṃkhya* liberation is a state of *kaivalya*, where *puruṣa*, is pure and in no contact with anything. The word is also Jain, and indeed the state is practically the Jain one too, and on enlightenment a Jain becomes *kevalin*. In fact, better knowledge of the development of Jainism would assist our understanding of that of *Sāṃkhya*; the dualism of *Sāṃkhya* I would attribute to the influence of the materialists.

26. We do not seem to have a dualism yet in the *Upaniṣad*; it would be good to be able to translate *KaṭhU* (1/) 3.10 taking *para* as «other»: «The sense data are other than the senses, the mind other than the sense-data [here protesting against the Buddhist serialist view], the *viññāna* is other than the mind, the great self other than the *viññāna* [again asserting the relation of substratum and quality against the Buddhists]; the matter is other than the great self, [the cosmic] *puruṣa* other than matter». But the next phrase, «There is nothing other than *puruṣa*», would be impossible. We might claim a pun «there is nothing higher», but it would not be convincing.



There are also other terms which, however confusing, must indicate development of thought. The *MahāBhārata* is a mine of such confusing information, with various stages of belief, with their technical terms, which often change meaning. For example, *ksetrajña* is different from *ātman*, and is later just a synonym for *puruṣa*; it is the term substituted for *bhoktr*, which in *KaṭhU* (1/) 3.4 is the *ātman* joined with sense and manas<sup>27</sup>, but *ksetrajña*, knowing the field, must be knowing, while the *ātman* is said to be unknowing, *ajña*, as it should be as a substratum. Why the term *ksetrajña* should catch on I do not know, for *kṣetra* is not used alone psychologically, though it is sexually, and we might remember *puruṣa* has also the male significance. Then there is a *bhūtātman*, that part of the corporeal being which transmigrates; evidently it begins as the *jīva*, (it might mean the big-element self), and ends as the *lingaśrīra*.

We might now leave this attempt to trace philosophic growth and interdependence. There is always a problem about where is consciousness or what. The Indian had to show his doctrine was old, so that his natural tendency is to obliterate the traces of growth, and we hope any subsequent obscurity will not be held solely our fault.

### *Role of asceticism and conception of nirvāṇa*

We have seen that a permanent entity, variously called, is generally agreed. From this, the Buddhists dissent, however, if not originally at least soon<sup>27a</sup>. Also agreed is the possibility of human action (though this

27. Following Johnston and Hume, emending to *ātmendriyamanoyukto* from *-tam*.

27a. Conventionally the *Upaniṣads* precede the heresies, and even when some are admitted to be post-Buddha, there seems to be a tacit agreement not to see references to the heresies in them. But in fact several Upaniṣadic verses are probably aimed at heretics, whom it would only honour and publicize to name. Thus *Isa* 6: « But he who traces all beings just in his/the self, and his/the self in all beings, he does not desire to know/enquire further ». - he has the answer.

*yās tu sārvaṇī bhūtāni | ātmān evāpupāśyati*

*sarvabhūtēsu cātmānaṁ | tāto nā vicikṣati*

The K. version (i.e. probably Bharadvaja c490 BC) substitutes in *d vijugupsati*, 'he will not seek to guard himself from it (such an *ātman*). The same pada would have the same implication in *KaṭhU* 2/1.12 (.12), which is a rewriting of .13: « A thumb-sized spirit is in the middle of the body, lord of what is to come into being from the elements; one does not seek to guard one's self from it », 'it' is probably not the body, which would make the passage anti-ascetic, since Prakudha was an ascetic.

*anguṣṭhamātraṁ puruṣo | madhya ātmani tiṣṭhati*

*iśāno bhūtabhavyasya | na tāto vijugupsati*

It is possible to take *cd* together, « One who is lord of past and future has no objections to it », i.e. probably to the (permanent) *puruṣa*. To the heresies life is pain, and this may give point to *Isa* 7: « Where the *ātman* of one who knows has become all creatures, there what is the delusion, what the pain of one who traces/sees the unity? »

*yāsmiṁ sārvaṇī bhūtāni | ātmaivābhūd vijānatāḥ*

*tātra kó móhaḥ kāḥ śoka | ekatvām anupāśyataḥ*

In *KaṭhU* 2/1.4, 2/2.1 (4.4, 5.1) *na socati* has probably similar implication.

is denied by the Ājīvakas), even if human initiative is limited not obviously. No one at all seems to deny the propriety of asceticism in the 6th century, though there is a difference on its function and value.

The Buddhists assert asceticism not as a value in itself, but in a middle way (however unmiddle it seems to us) as a useful aid to contemplation, and a means of taming physical desires. Buddha himself found that it did not conduce to knowledge beyond a point, and its extremes involved motive or action. There is a constant warning in Buddhism that people who take to asceticism/discipleship for the sake of the *iddhi*, supernormal powers, for vulgar miracles, are not wanted; it is a losing battle, and we certainly find plenty of power-miracles in the *Jataka* and the *Pali* canon, not to mention the Sanskrit *Lalitavistara*. Power-miracles seem to be peculiarly attractive when they discomfit and even kill the enemy. Christianity was equally unable to keep these out, though its success in the sacred canon, the New Testament, is real, as may be seen by comparison with the apocryphal gospels.

Presumably the Ājīvakas would justify asceticism not as an activity or choice, but as the method whereby in fact nature brings one to *nirvana*. They did not, any more than the Jainis, set a limit to it and are often accused of disgusting practices such as eating dung. Disgusting practices are to be found among Indian ascetic down to modern times; they proved the *sādhu* was beyond good and evil, and so superior to the populace. King George V was offered an exhibition of masturbation, but declined.

The Jains approve austerity partly as a means of washing off action, but really as a form of non-action (the final form being religious suicide). Good action — and this is a legitimate criticism of all Indian sects — is undoubtedly better than bad action, but it is not the decisive alternative: it still leaves one having *karma*, and so is not the way to *nirvāṇa/ātman*. One may win aeons in heavens, but is still under the error of individuality and *samsāra*. The Buddhists believe that good *karma* should be acquired, and this makes possible later the idea of transferring merit. The Jains, however, would not hold that it cancelled bad; to them both must bear fruit. (This seems inconsistent with the idea of washing off *karma*; *karma* as *pudgala* is destructible; asceticism may then destroy good and bad alike before they bear fruit). For the Jains, only by stopping actions can there be a cessation of the onflow of *karma*, and hence they approve ritual suicide on the attainment of enlightenment. Buddhism and the *Gīta* (c200 B.C.) try to counter this by placing the real action in the motive, hence in the *Gīta* action without motive does not produce *karma*. But to the Jain the action is in the action; the motive thought may be itself another action. This is the popular orthodox position also.

Asceticism is connected with meditation in all sects, and a great deal is said about meditations which English has not the terms to translate or most Westerners the experience to understand. Orthodoxy al-

ways approves asceticism on which it seems able to look occasionally with a sense of humour. *tapas* could originally be undertaken for any purpose; it must produce whatever its owner wills. If death can be regarded as a *tapas*, we can understand the power of the last wish in *samsāra*; so too the custom of *dhāraṇa*, fasting against somebody (known also from Ireland and hence Indo-European), is a means of producing *tapas* against him, so that his will is compelled<sup>28</sup>. In the Purana *tapas* is commonly less balefully used to produce progeny when other less drastic methods have failed. It can give such power that even gods can be deposed; so Indra felt his seat getting hot through the *tapas* of Viśvāmitra, and it was a great risk for the nymph Menakā when she undertook to seduce the sage with Indra's help to save his throne. Ascetics can be appallingly irritable, especially when interrupted in contemplation, as Śakuntalā found to her cost. But while the power of *tapas* may be misused, it is possible to turn it, like atomic energy, to peaceful purposes. By getting beyond the senses the ascetic can know *ātman* directly without the differentiation of his personality.

But the orthodox would not allow everyone to practise *tapas*, just as gold jewellery is not proper for *sūdras* or untouchables. We hear of the drought and desolation found by King Daśaratha, which he traced to the prodigy of a *sūdra* doing *tapas*; the gallant king at once cut off his head and stopped that nonsense, whereupon the fertile year was restored with the restored *ṛta*. The brahman *tapas* was not a caste duty except to brahmins; in so far as it results in attaining *brahma/nirvāṇa*, it is disruptive of society when performed by people of other fixed economic or social function — which is the chief Chinese charge against Buddhism — and there is no doubt that the flood of mendicants did at

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28. This might be relevant to BAU 5/13.3 *Kāṇva* (which follows 5/2.3 in *Mādhyandina*);

*krāto smara kṛtam smara*

If we take *krato* as vocative, *kṛtam* should also be so: «Remember, O intention, remember O deed». If the interpretation is adjusted to the time when one's *vidyākarmāṇi*, knowledge and deed, take hold on one after death, that might make sense; or we could translate: «Remember (your) knowledge, remember your deed», since *smr* can take genitive, and *krato smara* and *kratos smara* could be written as the former. But *Mādhyandina* reads:

*krāto smāra klibé smāra āgne nāya supāthā rāye asmān...*

We suggest: remove the accent from *smara* (the second *smara* as written need not have one). Read as original, *krātos smara klibés smara...* «Remember your will/intention, remember the way; Agni, by a good path, lead us to wealth». The native tradition clearly does not know at all what *klibé* means; we try comparison with Gk. Keleuthos (\**kleu-dhos*, \**kleyu-dhos*), Lith. keliauju, path; this makes good sense with *agne, supāthā naya*. The previous line also seems obscure, but it too is not spoken by the dying; but by the bystanders at the pyre;

*vāyūr ānīlam amṛtam āthedām bhāsmāntam śārīram*

«Let them blow immortal wind, then this body (will be) having its end in ashes (for we will get a decent draught for the pyre)».

times pose social and economic problems. In so far as *tapas* gave supernatural powers, these were no more for the good order of society than the unrestricted possession of firearms in modern America.

As often happens, the depressed do not share privilege with everyone when they get it. And to *Jain* and *Ājīvaka* one cannot become a *kevalin*, reach perfection/*nirvana*, as a female; some even say that women can only reach the fifth stage in the ladder of liberation, controlling moderate anger, deceit, pride, and greed. Buddhism accepted nuns, not without hesitation; but Buddhas are all male. This holds also for the Jain, whose *Tirthaṅkaras* in this age are all male (though the *Svetāmbaras* say Mallinātha, the 19th, was female), and in the coming DuṣamaSuṣama age all are again male, though a surprising number are/recently were in female incarnation. The acceptance of nuns raised both the question of women having an *ātman*, which transmigration was deciding in favour of commoners, but it also raised practical questions of property, all women being *in manu* at this time. The grammarian Pāṇini (c. 420), or his *gaṇa* to Aṣṭādhyāyī 6/2.26, knows female ascetics in the terms *kumārātāpasī*, *parivrājikā*, but whether as a grammatical possibility or a fact of life is never too clear; but in 2/1.70 he himself certainly knows heretical female ascetics, *śramaṇī*.

*Tapas* is in effect a sacrifice, and as such, whenever it is performed correctly, it must confer/manifest its powers, whoever the performer. But in its concentration asceticism has no place for beauty in life or nature; there is no beauty where there is no love, and no love where there is no beauty. *tapas* is after all an assertion or magnification of self, and so exclusive of love. This attitude has important effects on Indian art and thought, extending to the body also, which is not loved, and therefore not respected. In the legend, when Buddha slunk out of his palace, the sweat, breasts, and general immodesty of the attendant women roused his disgust; but *Maitr.U* 1.3 (of c. 120 B.C.) is a similar and typical tirade against the body from orthodoxy. Frankly the body stinks, not to mention its chronic ills. This attitude on the one hand precludes respect, and reflects a greater revulsion from a greater sensuality, paradoxically it is also anti-ethical, as anti-emotional; intellectual is substituted for physical selfishness.

One might wonder whether the sexual side of *tapas* has something to do with the resentment of the body, of which women have to bear the main guilt. Men have to retain their semen, and women are after it. Naturally there is no hope or point in improving life that is so basically vitiated; the physical vice infects all, and on the question of life being pain there is no dissension, even if it is the Buddhists who make the point most dogmatically. Little sympathy is due to suffering, since it is only just payment for *karma*. Here we have the paradox of Buddhist compassion, but though Aśoka took active measures, as did Jayavarman VII in Cambodia, the compassion is rather the hopeless one of « we're all in it together » than the desire to ameliorate material conditions for

man or beast; the social caste is unchallenged. Mahāyāna Buddhism revolts/deplores, but does not deny the justice of *karma*: we might say the compassion is collective and academic, however sincere. And though misery of being alive is not a doctrine that people readily believe, so that the sensual receives full acknowledgement in the various heavens, neither life nor the world have the seal of intellectual approval. All want release from them, *mokṣa*, to *ātman/brahma/nirvāṇa*. How different from the Scottish farmer of the poor fields by St. Mary's Loch, who for his heaven could say « Gie me Bowerhope tae a' eternity at a reasonable rent »!

In the Jain *nirvāṇa* there is an infinite number of perfect *jīvas*, souls, in no mutual or material contact. The perfect soul has perfect knowledge, *kevalin*, but is beyond any contact or interest in this (or any) world or other *kevalins*. Indeed, since *karma* is (almost) inevitable in the flesh, the only sure way of not acquiring any at all once *kevalin*, is to become rigid, and finally die in religious suicide by starvation. This is reflected in the rigid upright *kayotsarga* posture of Jain images, best known from the colossus at Sravana Belgola. All human affection must be cast aside and overcome to attain perfection; so Indrabhūti Gautama, Mahāvīra's successor, could not conquer his affection for the master until the very last night of the latter's existence; then he managed, and become *kevalin*.

As *kevalin* in *mokṣa*, *siddha*, perfected, one enjoys omniscience, omnivision, illimitable *sattva/satya* (being), infinite strength, perfect bliss, beyond pain and pleasure, indestructibility, existence without form (presumably not necessarily human shape, since one has) a body neither light not heavy (Cf. the *Ājīvaka* soul, above). Some of this may sound contradictory, and all may not stem from the same period; but the essential would be somewhat on the pattern of BAU 4/3.23ff, where one would be a knower if there was anything to know, etc.; we are also reminded of the bliss soul, *ānandamaya puruṣa*, of TaitU 2.5.

The *Ājīvaka kevalin* is much the same as the Jain, though perhaps as a result of the Mahāyāna and saviour cults of c100 A.D., he seems liable to be called back into service when the religion is threatened — apparently in vain, for it become extinct in the 15th century A.D. The Jains have no provision for a future *Tīrthanikara* till the upward Duṣama-Suṣama age. By the Gupta period Buddhists too contemplate sadly the coming extinction of the Law.

Pluralistic *Sāṅkhya's mokṣa* must be practically the same as the Jain also. The general orthodox *mokṣa* is not very different and is equally inactive. Either, as BAU 4/4.6, being *brahma* one goes to *brahma*, or as .23, one sees *atman* in the *atman* (the relationship of part-whole not being too clear): or in *Sāṅkhya*, free from gross and subtle body, and therefore free from/beyond pleasure and pain, and intellect, seeing the self in the self only, *puruṣa*, freed from *prakṛti*, matter, one exists for ever and ever (though with matter time also should go, but this state should be, and later probably is, limited in time by the cyclic brahma-

universe). *Sāṃkya* like Buddhism and Jainism emphasized pain, and the release is negative; there is no return from it.

Buddhist *nirvāṇa* is subject of much dispute. Buddhism developed so that it is hard to know the original, whereas Jainism and Ājīvakism remained static, though we do not know quite from when. Buddhist polemics on *nirvāṇa* are directed against permanence, *śaśvattā/sassatā*, and annihilation, *uccheda*, of the individual. This is perfectly intelligible of a series while it goes on, and the continuity whereby the individual is the same and different could lie in the unequal duration and consequent overlapping of elements in the bundle, *skandha*. But if this is the explanation, *nirvāṇa* would be annihilation, even if the serialist thought of nothing is the non-existing existence. It is difficult to believe that to Buddha *nirvāṇa* meant nothing; if it had, he could have been a follower of Ajita Keśakambalin. If the object of life is to get annihilated, impending death offers an excellent opportunity; but religious suicide is certainly not Buddhist in the classical period. It is true that Godhika in *Saṃyutta-Nikāya* 1.109 is not condemned for making sure of *nirvāṇa* in this way after having attained the standard. But unless morality is a supreme value in itself, there can be no need to wait for perfection before annihilation: if one has been hasty in the business, it cannot be remedied or cannot even matter.

It would be possible that Buddha believed with some contemporary Greeks that the best thing was to be dead, and that there was a massive death-wish in society, just as there is in modern society to deny the significance of man. If so, he could hold that real death will not occur, there will be transmigration, in which he believed, so long as there are *skandhas*, bundles, bound together by action, *karma*. Entities must cease to interact. Here again, such an idea would explain Ajita's asceticism, or indeed Prakudha's, and Buddha could have followed them, or Mahāvīra.

Buddha's attitude would seem to have been that the nature of *nirvāṇa* is not as important as its existence; the point is to reach it, otherwise one will only continue in the round of suffering. His objection to enquiry is like that which can be raised against the excessive concentration of modern philosophy on logic as epistemology; it does not follow that no one knows anything till he knows how he knows, since if it were so no one would ever have known anything. The important thing is to know, and indeed, modern epistemology has not helped anyone to know anything. Buddha discouraged certain speculations as not only not conducive to knowledge, but hindrances to attaining *nirvāṇa*. These are the forbidden questions, Does a Buddha/Tathāgata exist, or not-exist, or exist-and-not-exist, or neither-exist-nor-not-exist after death?

It might be that Buddha did not pretend to know, and as the agnostic position is fashionable today, it is credited to him. But if he did not know, he is not likely to have been afraid to say so. In this case it is easy to understand his disciples with their brahmin mentality for perfection feeling that they could not allow their Fully enlightened One the

luxury of such ignorance. Omniscience is attributed to the Jina, and other fully enlightened ones. Buddha would not be or need to be so unheroic as to fear losing disciples if he admitted his goal was annihilation — death was much too commonplace in his society.

As handed down, the question is put in the terminology of the doctrine of *Sañjaya/Srñjaya*? *Vairāṣṭripūtra*, who denied the possibility of knowledge, and so its date depends upon his. The Jain logic of *syādvāda* is clearly a reply to his formulation, so we may put this question (if we lay any weight on the interest of Ajātaśatru, late) in Buddha's lifetime. A common later answer is that as *nirvāṇa* is beyond the categories of this world, language is unable to apply to it, and such phrases as being and not-being are meaningless with regard to what is outside our universe, to the ineffable<sup>29</sup>. The Aristotelian in us replies that nothing is beyond the category of being and not-being. At any rate, nature abhors a vacuum, and at least some Buddhists wanted a positive content for *nirvāṇa*, and came to conceive it in the way of their fellows, a brahma(n) which absorbed the impermanent individual.

Properly speaking one attains *nirvāṇa* on enlightenment. Buddha did so in 530, and his physical death in 486 is only a *mahāparinirvāṇa*, completing the business. Between these two dates he was *jīvanmukta*, released (but) living, an *arhat*, even if a very special one. All an *arhat*<sup>30</sup> has to do is to continue in grace, beyond desires (properly speaking inevitable), until his *mahāparinirvāṇa*, physical death. The question that vexed the council of Vaiśālī in 386, « can an arhat fall? », « may well refer to the antinomian temptations such as we found in *KauṣU* 3.8 and can certainly be read into such passages a *BAU* 4/4.22. Such things have always proved tempting to Indian ascetics, notably the unqualified, i.e. non-brahmins, as may be seen from the devotional antinomian Tantric cults. They persisted, for example, in the Thugs, or the erotic esoteric cults such as Goetz [Rupzlekhz XXXII z] finds explain certain temples and history at Khajurao in the 11th century. Nor does the danger seem to be totally eradicated even today.

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29. The phrasing of Sañjaya's agnosticism follows closely that of Ajita's denials; « Is there an other world? Are creatures *upapātika*, fortuitous? Is there fruit of good and evil deeds? Does a *Tathāgata* exist after death? ». This last question is a special case of Ajita's statement that neither heretic nor orthodox truth-finder has returned to tell us. There should therefore be a special relation between Ajita and Sañjaya. *atthi sattā opapātikā*: We can have the archaism of singular verb and neuter plural subject; but we might have the abstract *sat-tā*, existence, which is upaniṣadic.

30. Literally « fit, able ». Does this account for the phrase *balapratta* (= *-prāpta*, if it does) « having won strength »? Or have we the Jain omnipotence in it? Cf. our note *Ch. V*, n. 20.



## Ethics

Amoral gods cannot help man to self-realization; but their powers are not abrogated because a person wants to realize himself. The Vedic rites continue; but the sacrifice is only for those who want what the sacrifice can give — the things everyone in the householder stage wants. The heresies do not denounce the sacrifice in itself; they do denounce animal sacrifice. But they left untouched the domestic rites, of birth, marriage, daily life and death. They were interested in release, not in daily life. This reliance on the brahmin for such intimate affairs must certainly have saved the heretics from persecution and social ostracism, but in the long run it facilitated the relapse of the various heresies into Hinduism. Just as the gods were left as irrelevant, so also were the rites, which were under considerable cloud in orthodox circles; they were unsafe boats (over the stream of *samsāra*) in *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 1/2.7 though the same text in .10 confesses their efficacy in winning heavens. Thus Buddhism, by not attacking the sacrificial system, by merely widening the meaning of karma with respect to *samsāra*, made and still makes minimum demands, and so has always been able to be very easily added to local religions in and beyond India. But martyrdom, persecution, and unpopularity bind, and minimum demands do not suggest a pearl of great price.

The influence of the heresies is exerted in orthodoxy against animal sacrifice. This is generally called *ahiṃsā*. The word first occurs in *ChU* 3/17.4, where freedom from desire to hurt is a virtue to be cultivated along with *tapas*, liberality (to brahmins), honesty, and truth-speaking. The date of this passage I do not know, but it should be before *ChU* 5/10, and one would be content with the 6th century. But the word tends to become circumscribed to the non-injury of animal life (in the widest sense), specifically not killing living things. (It was left to Gandhi to make it positive), and if it so means in *ChU* 3/17, it might be another indication of the contemporaneity of (a reworking of) that text with *Mahāvīra*.

The basis of this *ahiṃsā* is magical, not humanitarian. *ahiṃsā* never applies to man — it remains the duty of ksatriyas to kill, as is emphatically stated in the *Gita*. An in certainly never led to any greater kindness to animals. The attitude is rather like the modern, « preserve the breathing », and morality is satisfied. Indeed, just as in the capital punishment argument there is often no interest in the (innocent and hence presumably better) victim, so *ahiṃsa* does not preserve the more precious animal, man. Nor is there an Indian movement to prevent cruelty to animals: if tortoise-shell is wanted, catch the turtle, split off the shell and put it back in the water quickly; you have not killed it.

The basis of *ahiṃsā* — pace Gonda, negative, not-hurting — is magical and magical formulae do not produce charity; they are legalistic. So the killed animal has a ghost like ourselves, and will be resentful against its murderer [cf. *Am. Soc.* II, p. 65, n. 3]. So at the animal sacri-

fice the animal must utter no cry (so kin will not know there is anything wrong, and so take up the blood feud); everyone present turns their face away (so that the ghost will not be able to identify the assailants); if the beast is strangled, no blood has been shed (so it cannot call out), and the victim is then whole; or a special tool must be used in any case, by a special man, the *samitr*, quietener. However, the *Veda* could not be denied, and animal sacrifice is always permitted, though an embarrassment in classical times.

Hopkins is probably right in attributing the decline in number, and notably the decline in size, of animals offered to economic reasons; the decline of meat-eating — easy to understand on seeing an Indian cow — is probably also a factor, especially towards the substitution of smaller victims. In the Homeric hecatomb the gods liked the offal, so that men could get fed on the rest with divine goodwill. Hunting continued — it is a vice of kings, probably connected at least originally with military fitness. But again, the ethos of the culture is set not by the fighting, but by the thinking, class. Of the four references in the Gita to *ahimsā*, only one is in the original (10.5 in a list of virtues, without further expansion). But the Indian acquires and retains a great sympathy, of a rather spectator kind, for life; wishing the good of all creatures means leaving them all to fight it out among themselves and hoping everybody wins; after all tigers have to feed just as much as deer, and even if they have worse *karma*, there are times when our *karma* is our *dharma*.

The Jains are most particular on not killing, even to not killing one-sense *jīvas*. Considering that *jīva* is indestructible, this is not easy to understand, but the idea seems to be that by killing one obstructs the victim's working-out-his-*karma*. It is certainly wrong to say that *ahimsā* is due to the belief in *samsāra*, since by *karma* one would normally expect to be eating other people's grandmothers rather than one's own, and when a vegetable stage is admitted, one is going to be eating people anyway. Herodotus tells us of a tribe of Indoi who did eat their dead parent(s) ceremonially (thus, though he does not say so, assuring themselves of their parents' qualities and perhaps receiving their souls).

It is also likely that killing would entail more serious magical consequences on a brahmin than on another, since he is himself more holy. In *BAU* 1/5.14 nothing should be killed (i.e., by a *brahman*) on the night of new moon; so the extension of the idea of not-killing could spread from brahman sources. It may be that *ahimsā* spread from the cow, which is already *aghnya*, not to be killed, in the *RigVeda*, and is already sacred in *AV* 12/4.5, *ŚpB* III 1/2.21 and *Kauṣ* .B 12.6<sup>31</sup>. But the idea may

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31. Though there is no question that *aghnya* is etymologized as «not to be killed» (root [g]han) in classical times, the inviolability of the cow does not seem to be widely spread in the pre-Christian era, and is not demonstrable for Buddha's time. This leads one to question the conventional etymology; one can think of Gk. *apheñeîos*, rich, wealthy, abundant, but this might be ruled out by *áphenos* if this

also be strengthened by caste: just as there is a place for every human being in the human world with work and duty, and for man in nature, so there is a place for every caste of animal in nature's world.

It may be said that heresies introduce morality, though their goal, brahma for laymen, is not moral, but rather intellectual. But though intellectual, it is not attained by logical syllogism; it needs the moral preparation of overcoming desires and hatreds. By making a community some morality might have to be enforced; but in a community of renouncers and contemplators limited prohibitions might suffice. By accepting laity who continue living in the world, a morality is made necessary; that is, not that people now begin to be moral, but the moral is decisively integrated into the religious.

The invention of laymen must be heretical, since there is no occasion for such in orthodoxy. Who's responsible one cannot say, but the natural suggestion is Buddha; not Mahāvīra, since he is younger; and so almost certainly is Gosāla, whom the Jains represent as younger than Mahāvīra also, but their account is tendentious, and he, being more conservative, may be older. While Mahāvīra is generally believed to have revitalized the sect of Pārśva, how organized this sect was is unknowable on present evidence. Its rules were not to take life, not to lie, or steal, or own property: Mahavira added a fifth requirement, chastity<sup>32</sup>.

Buddha's five moral precepts for laymen are very close; not killing living things, not taking what is not given, no unchastity or incontinence, no falsehood, and no intoxicants. Laymen are bound to own property, but doubtless novices, who are still technically laymen, would, have their property dormant. Just as Buddha believed in limited austerity, so in the order there is limited property, a robe (and a change) and a begging-bowl. Buddha does not approve of nudity. Religious nudity might be originally magical; however, Buddha's line may well point up the rising standard of living in the 6th century B.C., in which case nudity is an example of having no property. Clothes are not needed at least in the Lower Ganges area, and what has been normal enough became, with the rising standard of living, odd and ascetic, just as the 13th century plain living/plain

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is not a re-formation. The Sanskrit *aghnya* is accented on first or second syllable which suggests reformation, hence re-understanding in Sanskrit. Another and possibility is to connect with the Indo-European *aghwnos*, lamb (Gk. *amnos* Lat. *agnus*). The Sanskrit word is always applied to cows, but one can think of a semantic shift such as we have in English « hog », which is sheep or pig. In this case, *aghnya* would be the cow with young, or masculine, the impubic male animal. Waldy Pokorni's entry [p. 491] under 1 *ghwen* would make the first suggestion defensible, but the initial *a-* would have to represent the weak grade of *en*, *in*.

32. This is not really very convincing. If Pārśva's followers could have children, property looks inevitable. Just as it is hard to believe that Buddha just added one meditation to Ājāra Kālāma or Udraka Rāmaputra, it is not likely that Mahāvīra did no more than to copy Buddha and add chastity to the requirements - it is no very vast additon, and we would expect sex to be under some rules in any lay community, though Svetaketu is reported to have felt them rather lax.

clothes in positive jail-punishment to today's would-be monk, and American Catholics are demanding relaxations of discipline. Buddha ordained rather the minimum of decency, and nudity, which had been ordinary, becomes after 500 B.C. an asceticism, breaking one more tie with the world. Finally it becomes an anachronism by the 1st century A.D., and we have the split of the Digambara and Śvetāmbara Jains.

The forbidding of *sūra* is natural enough, as much may happen under the influence of drink, and does not seem to have lain as a heavy burden on the community (Vedic *soma* seems extinct in the Pali canon). The non-killing of life offers some difficulty, because Buddha would eat meat, at least if it had not been killed specially for himself. As monks would tend to beg among the faithful, it would seem that there meat-eating was not unknown; so we may have later Jain influence in this rule. Here we might say the virtue liberality is democratized; it originally belongs especially to kings, and is directed to fit objects, sub-kings, guests and brahmins; it is still confined to fit objects, holy beggars, but there are plenty of them, and even the poor can acquire merit by giving to them.

Chastity, also a non-action, is next best to celibacy; although to some modern educators it is not preferable to charity, with which it is felt incompatible, still sexual self-control is central to any civilization and culture. The abandonment of it is rather like the advantages to the unbeliever of living in a Christian society. Without chastity, freedom from desire is impossible; it is therefore fundamental to the heresies, and unchastity is the stock and automatic charge against deviationists. The positive moral rules are those against stealing and falsehood, since these directly affect others. If there are laymen they must be offered something, and an ethical code can present a challenge, but also a recognition of the daily round and its abnegations.

Laymen are perhaps more crude and down-to-earth than educated clergy, so if *karma* is to be just, it must be visibly just with no quibbles, prevarications, or other casuistry. Hence growth of Hells seems to come from the heresies; they are a great spur and comfort to morality. Their genesis is long before, as when in RV 7/104.3 Indra and Soma bind evildoers where they cannot get out, or in AV 5/19 when people who injure brahmins sit in streams of blood eating hair.

The *Ājīvakas* believed in seven births as a *piśāca* (translated « goblin » normally malevolent dead, from (a)*pi-śak*, be strong against, or with change of *ś* from *ṣ* under taboo, (a)*pi-sac*, follow on against?), and 3000 *niraya* (Purgatories, since there is no reward or punishment; in other sects these are hells), and the journey of the soul is 8,400,000 *mahākalpas*.

The Jains are well equipped with hells, seven with fifteen classes of gods in charge of tortures (which may suggest superimposed conceptions). There is the crusher, the separator of bone from flesh, flesh-tearer, beater; *Rudras* Grade Two keep spearing men and Grade One chop them into mincemeat. *Kālas* Grade Two roast the flesh of victims, while

Grade One tear it with pincers. There are some to cut the victims with swords, others to shoot them with arrows, *Kumbhas* who torture with chillies (these last four evidently from the actual penal code): who steep men in hot sand, dash them against stones in streams of boiling water; make them sit on thorny trees; finally the *mahāghoṣa* (great yell) shut men up in black holes (which should at least be more restful). The specialization is rather like that in Henry Ford's assembly line, and must be very boring for the gods so employed. However, karma does get washed off/exhausted by all this, and even some of the *Tirthaṅkaras*-to-be of the DuṣamaSuṣama era are at present working off *karma* in the first and third hells.

With hells go heavens. The inevitable tendency is, as in Christianity, to think of these in material terms, physical tortures for hells, and physical pleasures for heavens. The Christian conceptions have been less specialized, since hell is less real and important than heaven, and eternal flames are there for everyone. Mediaeval artists conceive of devils making sure of their victims, dragging them in and keeping them in; but the lack of systematization clearly shows that the theologians have not taken them so seriously. Hell implies punishment, and purgatory hope; and in this sense the Jain hells are also purgatories, save that there is no promise or guarantee that one will learn from past experience; there is a chance, but no promise of doing better.

The Buddhists also invent plenty of hells, eight hot, eight cold, plus minor ones (later additions perhaps). There is also the possibility of being born here as a *preta*, ghost, always painfully both thirsty and hungry. In systematization there is the usual inconsistency; e.g. those who have compassion for the welfare of all living beings are reborn in heaven — fair enough; or if as human beings, they are long lived (and life, as we remember, is pain!). Crimes of violence produce sickness, of anger ugliness, ambition weakness, miserliness poverty, pride low birth, and for ignoring the clergy, stupidity. Hells are by no means confined to heretics, they seep into orthodoxy, and Manu knows 21.

Buddha doubtless meant Buddhism to be simple enough. There are Four Noble truths.

(1) Suffering exists, pain is real. While there were Greeks able to assert the greater reality and significance of pain, it is perhaps difficult for us who are of a religion of hope, in a world that God made, to understand this. I doubt if the ancient Greek was in any greater danger than the ancient Indian except possibly in the matter of disease; enslavement was far more probable in the Near East. Yet three of the things that upset Buddha, we are told, were physical: old age, sickness, and a corpse. Old age in fighting society is deplorable; it is an evil in Greece too; but there is the common brahmanical wish « May you live a hundred years » in the birth ceremonies. It is a striking triumph of the Chinese Confucian civilian mind, which aims that men should live together, that old age has

no terror, but brings wisdom and respect. If we are living to ourselves, undoubtedly the loss of physical pleasure is going to be a distress of old age; but Buddha was hardly that kind of man. It is easy to understand revulsion and resentment of the physical and its end in a sensual man; but this too is not Buddha at least of tradition. One can understand a basic statement that desire is pain, ambition is pain and causes pain, and better is he who is beyond desire; but if this is the original premise, it is not put first.

(2) Suffering has a cause, *trṣṇā*, thirst, craving for existence.

(3) This craving can be stopped by

(4) the Noble Eightfold Path, which consists of:

1. Right views. One accepts the Four Noble truths; it may seem strange that the doctrine of impermanence was not one of them, but Buddha was concerned more with attaining *nirvana* than theorizing about it.

2. Right resolve/aspiration, and benevolence, good-will.

3. Right speech; no lying, abuse, gossip, slander, etc.

4. Right action; no killing, no theft. Not taking what is not given might include not appropriating what you find. Property is strict, and a slave is forbidden the order, since that would be depriving his owner of property, not to mention the obvious abuses that creep in. Presumably a slave could be a layman.

5. Right livelihood: abstaining from the forbidden modes of living (presumably any that caused death of living creatures, such as butcher, fisher, fowler, and possibly by extension, those that involved killing, such as leather-worker; but note, *kṣatriya* is not among them. One might wonder how original these are).

6. Right effort; suppress evil states of mind (i.e., wrong desires), eradicate those that have arisen; stimulate good states, perfect those that have arisen (which are essentially intellectual and meditative).

7. Right mindfulness; looking on the bundle, body and spirit, so as to remain self-possessed; i.e. free from attachment, and mindful, watchful against it. So far all these could basically apply to the laity, and one would think attachment to the Three Jewels would be permissible for them. But the tendency is always to intellectualize, and one would think that the next is only for monks:

8. Right concentration by means of the four meditations.

Two sets of four are mentioned, but the one starting from the ordinary state of consciousness is (1) concentration on a chosen *kasina*, aid (earth, air, fire, water, light, or narrow aperture, colours *nīla*, *piṅgala*, *lohita*, *śukla*, dark blue, orange, red, white); accompanied by thoughts of the wretchedness of sensual pleasure, reflections on the excellence of the Three Jewels, (the Buddha, the *dharma* (Law), and the *saṅgha*, (church), thus obtaining a mental reflex devoid of the specific character of

a simple mental image. This opens the way to (2) the first trance, *dhyāna*. In it, free from desire and evil dispositions as a result of isolation and concentration by initial and sustained applications, one attains a condition of *prītisukha*, comfort of pleasure; then suppressing the application, one retains only the concentration, *ekodibhāva*, of thought produced by deep reflection, *samādhi*, still characterized by *prītisukha*. The pleasure, *prīti*, disappears in stage number (3) and one remains mindful, *smṛti-vant*, but indifferent; which state is evidently comfortable, *sukha*, but one is not actively asserting enjoyment in it. Then in stage number (4) putting away all pleasure and pain, destroying all elation and dejection, one has only pure self-possession and indifference. It is clear that all this is not meant to be easy, and also that it is not easy for one who has not experienced it to understand; but no originality is claimed for the experience in India.

The other set of four meditations are (after preliminary concentration, breathing exercises, etc.) (1a) passing beyond matter and sensation, suppressing the idea of multiformity, the only idea present is the infinity of space, *ākāśānantya*, then (1b) of intelligence, *viññānānantya*. (2) Nothing at all is present to the mind; this is *ākīñcanyāyatana*. (3) Neither presence nor absence of ideas is specifically present, *naivasañjñāsañjñāyatana*. (4) Suppression of both sensation and idea, *sañjñāvedayatanirodha*. Ālāra/Ārāḍa Kālāma got to no. 2, and Udraka to no. 3; Buddha is presumably claimed to have invented no. 4, a complete catalepsy. (As historic fact, this looks rather schematic, to cover up ignorance of the actual teaching of Buddha's teachers or even perhaps the extent of his debt). In our dynamic Western tradition I doubt if we are capable of producing a valid judgment on these states, since they have no answer to the problems of Western individualism and dynamic theism save to deny and denounce it. The condemnation can only be mutual, and it is significant that in a western system that has many analogues with Indian thought, Stoicism, though the wise man will be reabsorbed into God, the world that emanates from God is not *māyā*, illusion.

We might notice the Indian predilection for numbers and enumeration. Learning by memory may encourage this, but there is more to it. Though the Buddhists are for India moderate, Jains and, *Ājīvakas* are very fond of numbers, as are the Celtic peoples. The *Ājīvakas* were born 7 times as *piśācas*, 70 x 70 as *ājīva*, mendicants, and *Nāgas*, serpents; they know 36 elements of impurity (?), etc. The Jains have 9 categories, each considered in 10 different ways, 8 kinds of *karma*, 10 duties of monks, 9 kinds of merit, *puṇya*, 42 fruits thereof, 18 kinds of sin, 82 results in groups of 5, or 6, etc. 84 is a favourite number ( $3 \times 3^3 + 3$ ), as in the  $84 \times 10^5$  of the *Ājīvaka mahākalpas*, or Asoka's 84,000 stupas. Buddhas have 32 major distinguishing physical marks, etc. All this is artistic, but not philosophically fruitful.

Buddha's asceticism is fairly moderate. He may go as far as to demand contemplation of decaying corpses at a cemetery (which sug-

gests a custom of exposure: who is doing it?), but others, especially the *Ājīvakas*, seem to have emphatically demanded that. It may well explain their later popular connection with *piśācas*. Tibetan Buddhism knows the Obscene Idolhouse. There were repulsive forms of asceticism, such as eating human ordure. Otherwise ascetic yoga exercises, postures, and methods would be generally similar for all sects. The topic might change, but it must have had the general monotony of Christian Scientists' (who are a kind of Western Hindu), ringing the changes of Reality, Unreality, pain, matter. Many of the meditations would be the same for the orthodox and heretical ascetic, just as their trances cannot be very different.

When the heretics lay down a path, a line of conduct, the orthodox must do the same. But while the heresies legislate for people « entering the stream », the orthodox do so for people who are primarily members of a caste in the world; they are bound to prescribe the ritual and emphasize duty as a caste member, which takes precedence over what would be ethical duty of an absolute morality. The old mixture of ritual and ethical survives more (thought the importance of *ahimsā* borders on the ritual non-ethical in the heresies). Moreover, while *sūdras* should obey, the lawgivers are especially interested in ethics for the twice-born castes; no brahman would have bothered to have worked out a code for *Caṇḍālas*. The words may be general, and virtue compels its own acknowledgement even in *sūdras*; but it does not follow that the interest is general. Manu (DhS 10.63) gives a condensed rule of duty for all four castes (but there are people below the castes): not killing life, not to lie, or steal, purity (explained in the commentary to 6.92 as personal cleanliness (especially at magical times, like eating or sacrificing), control of the sensual passions. *Ibid.* 6.92 gives ten rules the twice-born: content (*dhr̥ti*), patience, self-control (*dama*), non-stealing, (ritual) purity, control of sensual passion, intelligence, (Vedic) knowledge (*vidyā*), truthfulness, freedom from anger. Basically these are as for the heresies, and also, basically either passive or negative. We might notice that while intelligence or knowledge is a virtue, strength is not; when the *sūdra* has to obey, there is not much point in inculcating courage into him. Virtue is bound to be circumscribed, because society is in communal coexistences, and so courage cannot be important when the whole aim of society is to avoid conflict. Courage is above all an individual virtue; it is then a caste virtue for soldiers in an unindividual society.

The predominance of the thinking class is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in these ethics, even though it is generally clear in thought. These are the virtues rather of the *brahman* ascetic than of practical daily life oriented for action. For example, any courage which might be contained in *dhr̥ti* (cf. *dhīra*, steadfast) is bearing, patience, not initiative. Buddha and Mahāvīra were both princes; Gośāla we suspect was a *vaiśya*, and these are usually tenacious enough of their gains or land to be willing to fight for them. But while all agree that life is pain and it is evil, none take Zoroaster's attitude and say « Let us fight evil ! »



Buddha and brahmin alike retreat from it, and this is partly accounted for by the intellectual mode of the whole culture.

Fighting is an emotional activity, and in so far as pleasurable to the animal, and also in so far as it is fought for worldly goods, women, or wealth, the only possible valuation of these is that they are good if they are worth fighting for. The emotional naturally tends to assert the value of life and the individual who feels the emotions. The usual fighter's path to the abstract is through honour, fame, and self-discipline, which he understands as a soldier. Though legend asserts both Buddha and Mahāvīra as supreme archers, for so perfect princes should be, there is no sign in the canons that either had ever fulfilled *kṣatriya* duties; this may be just subsequent hagiography, suppressing the unpleasant, and Buddha is reported as giving political advice. But it may be interpreted that the minor aristocracy had been reduced from fighting barons to gentlemen-farmers (and not always very good ones), and the armies were becoming professional, needless to say, not recruited (even mainly) from *kṣatriyas*. Soon after the founders' generation, the movements seem to be recruited from brahmin and *vaiśya* stock. It may be that the consolidation of kingdoms through the 5th century destroyed the *kṣatriya*, leaving quite few for Mahāpadma Nanda to liquidate. So our impression may still be true even if the *kṣatriyas* gave their quota. Kings may protect the heresies, but they may do it as politicians, or as kinsmen of the same social order as Gautama or Mahāvīra. But the absence of initiative, so necessary to the fighter, the warrior, marks the un-*kṣatriya* nature of the whole movement. The negative aim is not the individual's, it is not the fighter's.

There is one other mark which is not the *kṣatriya's*, however, admirable; there is no claim to authority over other ascetics, even by the *Tīrthamkaras*. Organization implies authority, but it remains essentially collective. We do hear of the Head of the *Vinaya*, but the Northern and Southern Buddhist names seem to differ from the beginning as after four teachers do the *Svetāmbara* and *Digambara* Jaina lists. The position seems to be a courtesy one rather than authoritarian. Individuals cannot avoid the authority of prestige, but there is never the authority of the officially recognized and organized hierarchy. The same goes for orthodoxy;; there is no temple hierarchy, there is no brahman hierarchy. This religious anarchy seems Indo-European, and we find it among the Irish druids, and inherited from them by the Celtic church.

Buddhism, Jainism, Ājīvakism are all ways for the individual to choose, and by choosing one saves one's self only. No one can do anything about anyone else's karma, never in Jainism, where even *Tīrthamkaras* can do nothing for anyone, and in Buddhism not until the demand for the saviour cults in the early centuries A.D. We find the same position in orthodoxy: every ascetic is winning release for himself, and is equally unable to help anyone. Even if Kṛṣṇa may grant release in the *Gīta*, there is no sign that he will grant it on prayer for another. This determination that we must pull ourselves up by our own bootstraps is one of

the attractions of Indian belief to the humanist today. It avoids the recompense and humiliation of obligation, and whether we can be our own salvation or not, it is too exciting a belief to reject, since it permits a perfectionism — which no God could exceed. But the Indians were certainly not very successful in the matter, as there was never any lack of population for *samsāra*.

There is, of course, no military urgency about salvation. All women must wait, and if you have the good fortune to get a birth in the world of the gods for a few thousand years, you can wait a bit longer. Gods here are less than human, since they cannot reach, *nirvāna*, but must return for a human incarnation to do that. Here again we might note the Indian unwillingness to say that a tradition is wrong; the Western mind would have denied the gods on accepting nirvana, just as the main object of of Western humanism is to reject Christ, who becomes irrelevant. The Indian is content to find a place for the gods, and even retain them in his affections; his pacifism extends to religion, and at most, he will let them die, whereas the Westerner is out to kill Christ and his church.

Just as suicide needs intellect, so the ideal of renunciation is intellectual — and so too was Hitler's anti-intellectualism highly intellectual. Sexual guilt and original sin becomes intellectual guilt and damnation. The assertion of the negative *brahma(n)* is intellectual. The question arises, « How, if brahmans were exclusive and secretive in their doctrines and teaching, were their ideas so completely taken over by members of the fighting and trading classes »? The question has not been sufficiently asked. Part of the answer may be that the caste division was much less strict than (later) tradition wants us to think and many *kṣatriyas* were *kṣatriyan brahmans*. But the real answer may lie in the original object of the heresies, the breaking of the *brāhmin* monopoly of *tapas*, supernatural power and experience, by the *brahma*. This *brahma* is only acquired by the other classes at a time when it is being transformed in nature and value by the brahmans themselves. One can also think of a leak in monopoly through the *purohitas*, attached to noble *kṣatriya* houses, or also see a situation where the high cost of sacrifice, the reduction of patrons, and an overcrowded profession, lead also to *brāhmin* distress and a willingness to agree with what some always know, that the material is not the final answer to human needs.